HATE SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATORY DISCOURSE IN MEDIA 2019 REPORT
HRANT DINK FOUNDATION

Hrant Dink Foundation was established after the assassination of Hrant Dink in front of his newspaper Agos on January 19, 2007, in order to avoid similar pains and to continue Hrant Dink’s legacy, his language and heart and his dream of a world that is more free and just. Democracy and human rights for everyone regardless of their ethnic, religious or cultural origin or gender is the Foundation’s main principle.

The Foundation works for a Turkey and a world where freedom of expression is limitless and all differences are allowed, lived, appreciated, multiplied and conscience outweighs the way we look at today and the past. As the Hrant Dink Foundation ‘our cause worth living’ is a future where a culture of dialogue, peace and empathy prevails.
HATE SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATORY DISCOURSE IN MEDIA
2019 REPORT

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As in many places in the world, the use of biased, prejudiced and discriminatory language can be observed in the media of Turkey. Universal and national principles of journalism do not address the use of hate speech and discriminatory discourse; even when they do so, media outlets violate these principles.

Provocative, racist and discriminatory language commonly used by the media, particularly in headlines and news titles, becomes an instrument that triggers enmity and discriminatory sentiment, while cementing stereotypes and allowing prejudices to take root against vulnerable groups in society. Targeted individuals and groups become anxious and silent, and are railroaded into giving up their essential democratic right to be involved in social and political life.

Discourse has the power to produce effects well beyond the neutral expression of thoughts or description of events. Discourse, which can be analyzed only in reference to the historical and social context in which it is generated, directly affects the way people make sense of a fact or situation and how they position themselves.¹ It is through discourse as a social practice that the sense of belonging to a group and the relationships between groups are constructed, understood and justified.²

Types of discrimination such as prejudice, racism, xenophobia, sexism, and homophobia lie behind hate speech and discriminatory discourse. Factors such as cultural identity and group characteristics influence the frequency of use of marginalizing and aggressive discourse, while circumstances such as rising nationalism or intolerance of difference further increase the impact of hate speech.

Insofar as the media have the power to embrace and normalize diversity and difference, they may also be influential in normalizing and fomenting conflict.

¹ Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse and Power” in Hate Crimes and Hate Speech, ed. Ayşe Çavdar and Aylin B. Yıldırım (İstanbul: Hrant Dink Foundation Publishing, 2010), p. 16.
Media could reinforce and even legitimize such attitudes by triggering and deepening racism and hatred.

For many years, the media in Turkey, as a primary source of hate speech and discriminatory discourse, have contributed considerably to the escalation of polarization within society. The Hrant Dink Foundation was founded in order to continue the struggles and carry out the dreams of Hrant Dink, who, until his murder, was portrayed in the media as an enemy in the eyes of society. One of the objectives of the foundation is to contribute to ending polarization and enmity within society. In this regard, the media monitoring work for identifying and exposing hate speech against ethnic, national and religious identities in the print media of Turkey has been carried out since 2009, as part of the Media Watch on Hate Speech project. In addition to research focusing on hate speech, the project also includes analysis on discourse that is designed in a more indirect and subtle way, as discriminatory discourse special issues. The Hate Speech and Discriminatory Discourse in Media 2019 Report is issued in order to provide a broader assessment, and to serve as a reference source; it includes qualitative and quantitative analysis of hate speech data in 2019, as well as a work titled “Discriminatory discourse against Kurds in Turkey’s print media: The example of 2019 local elections” which consists in analysis of the print media’s discourse on Kurds.

We hope this report will contribute to an increased awareness of the extent of polarizing discourse in society and the need for a new language which respects human rights.
ABOUT THE MEDIA WATCH ON HATE SPEECH PROJECT

AIM AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The general objective of the Media Watch on Hate Speech project is to contribute to efforts to combat racism and discrimination in Turkey. Considering the importance of civilian oversight of the media, it aims to strengthen respect for human rights and tolerance of difference in the media, to draw attention to discriminatory discourse and hate speech against persons and groups targeted for certain characteristics of their identity, as well as to raise awareness.

The long-term aim of this project is to contribute to the development of mechanisms that would help to combat hate speech and discriminatory discourse, enhance the media monitoring skills of non-governmental organizations, and make the language and methods used by media more egalitarian and respectful to social and cultural diversity by working together with departments of communication and media studies.

As part of this work, through the monitoring of national and local press in Turkey, texts that include discriminatory, marginalizing and targeting discourse were identified. In light of this data, media monitoring reports, including qualitative and quantitative analyses based on these data, are issued for periods of four months. These reports are sent to NGOs, media outlets, and occupational unions of journalists and academics, and are also released on our website.³

As part of the project, meetings, seminars and trainings with NGO representatives, legal experts, academics, occupational organizations and journalists are organized in order to raise awareness about hate speech. Upon invitations from NGOs and related institutions, workshops and trainings are organized in order to exchange knowledge and experience. Moreover, international panel discussions are held, meetings on hate speech are organized with universities, and the findings of the project are discussed in order to inform people about the concept of hate speech, to provide opportunities for discussing the possible methods for combating discriminatory and racist discourse, and to encourage the media to use a more conscious language which respects human rights.

In 2012, with the purpose of adding to the curriculum conceptual discussions on hate speech and ways of combating it, a draft syllabus titled *Discrimination, Hate Speech and Media* was prepared through close cooperation with academics and representatives of NGOs, and then shared with academics. The content of the syllabus has been developed in accordance with feedback from academics, and the work continues towards implementing the syllabus in universities.

In parallel with the works on curriculum, a book that would serve as a supplementary source for the syllabus, and as an introductory source for the general reader, was published in December 2013. Edited by Mahmut Çınar, with a preface by Fuat Keyman, the book was published—in Turkish—under the title *Media and Hate Speech: Concepts, Outlets, Discussions*.

Since the 2015 fall semester, as part of a collaboration with Istanbul Bilgi University’s Communications Department, students taking the courses titled “Independent Interdisciplinary” under the supervision of professors İtir Erhart and Nazan Haydari Pekkan have been attending workshops focusing on media monitoring methods and contributing to the media monitoring work of Hrant Dink Foundation.⁴

In news discussion workshops that continued in 2019, topics such as discrimination, hate speech and rights-based journalism were discussed through the analysis of selected columns and articles. Moreover, in order to reach a wider audience, the findings from the media watch reports have been turned into infographics and published as booklets. Infographics and videos are also shared on social media.

The knowledge and experience on hate speech and discriminatory discourse gained thanks to the work carried out since 2009 have paved the way for the founding of ASULIS Discourse, Dialog and Democracy Laboratory at the Hrant Dink Foundation, the first research center focusing on discourse in Turkey. Since the foundation of ASULIS in 2016, the project continues as a part of a broader study on discourse under the umbrella of the laboratory.

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⁴ In this regard, we would like to thank the students of Bilgi University who contributed to media monitoring during 2019 and our volunteers for their contribution to the project and the process of issuing this report.
METHODOLOGY

As part of the media monitoring work focusing on hate speech, all national newspapers and approximately 500 local newspapers are monitored based on predetermined keywords and phrases (e.g. “Jew”, “Muslim”, “traitor”, “bigot”, “giaour”, “refugee”) with a system provided by a media monitoring center. Weekday editions of these publications are scanned for news articles and columns containing these keywords and items containing hate speech are thus found.

While the main focus is hate speech on the basis of national, ethnic and religious identity, striking examples of discourse targeting women and LGBTIs are also included in the reports. The critical discourse analysis method commonly used in media studies is employed in the analysis process. In order to determine specific indicators for media items and discourse, quantitative scaling is used at first and then it is revealed which newspapers feature hate speech most, how it is featured and whom it targets.

In identifying hate speech in the news articles and columns, the recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1997 is taken as a basis. This recommendation defines hate speech as the following: “[Hate speech] covers all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”

In accordance with the purpose and scope explained above, news articles identified as featuring hate speech are categorized based on qualitative characteristics of the adopted discourse. The categories of hate speech determined by international studies previously conducted in the field of discourse, and in consideration of the country-specific linguistic and cultural differences, are as follows:

1. **exaggeration/attribution/distortion**: Any discourse that features negative generalization, distortion, exaggeration or negative attribution targeting a community as a whole, based on a specific individual or event (e.g. “Enough with the Syrians”).

2. **swearing/insult/defamation**: Any discourse that contains swearing, insult or defamation about a community (e.g. “treacherous”, “traitor”, “immoral”).

3. **enmity/war discourse**: Any discourse that includes hostile, war-mongering expressions about a community (e.g. “Greek atrocity”).

4. **symbolization**: Any discourse that uses various aspects of one’s inherent identity as a basis of hatred, humiliation or symbolization (e.g. “Will a Jew represent us in Eurovision?”).
CHAPTER I

HATE SPEECH IN 2019 IN PRINT MEDIA OF TURKEY
MEDIA WATCH FINDINGS

As part of the “Media Watch on Hate Speech” project, **4364 columns and news articles** targeting national, ethnic and religious groups were found in national and local newspapers in 2019. It was observed that **108** of them contained different categories of hate speech against more than one group. In these texts, **5515 hate speech content targeting 80 different groups** were found.

**In the January-April 2019** period, issues such as New Year’s celebration in Taksim, the sinking of refugee boats in the Aegean Sea (January 16), France’s declaration of April 24 as Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day (February 6), the anniversary of the Khojaly Massacre (February 26), International Women’s Day (March 8), US decision to recognize Israel’s dominance in the Golan Heights (March 25), racist attack at two mosques in New Zealand (March 15), 31 March local elections, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day (April 24) contributed to the generation of hate speech.

**In the May-August 2019** period, issues such as the international arrest warrant for foreign companies’ executives working with Turkish Petroleum (June 10), re-vote for Istanbul mayor (June 24), the Cyprus Peace Operation anniversary (July 19), the Srebrenica massacre anniversary (July 11), the anniversary of the coup attempt (July 15), Turkish Interior Minister’s order to send Syrians back to their registered cities (July 22), trials for damages filed in the US against Turkey over the confiscated properties during and after the Armenian Genocide, (August 30) Victory Day contributed to the generation of hate speech.

**In the September-December 2019** period, issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “Operation Peace Spring”, gas and oil exploration works in the Mediterranean Sea, and violations of human rights of refugees on the Greek border contributed to the generation of hate speech.
Items on the agenda around which hate speech is centered

**JANUARY**

1 January 2019
New Year celebration in Taksim

16 January 2019
Sinking of refugee boats in the Aegean Sea

**MARCH**

8 March 2019
International Women’s Day

15 March 2019
Racist attacks on two mosques in New Zealand

31 March 2019
Local elections

**FEBRUARY**

6 February 2019
France’s Declaration of 24 April as “the Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day” in France

26 February 2019
Anniversary of Khojaly Massacre

**APRIL**

24 April 2019
Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day

**MAY**

6 May 2019
Decision to repeat Istanbul mayoral election

**JUNE**

Tensions between Turkey and Southern Cyprus over natural resource exploration in the Mediterranean Sea

**AUGUST**

30 August 2019
Victory Day

**OCTOBER**

9 October 2019
The Operation Peace Spring

29 October 2019
US House of Representatives’ passing of resolution that recognizes the Armenian Genocide

**DECEMBER**

Violations of human rights of refugees on the Greek border

Christmas and New Year celebrations

**JULY**

11 July 2019
Anniversary of Srebrenica Massacre

19 July 2019
Anniversary of “Cyprus Peace Operation” trials for damages against Turkey over confiscated property during and after the Armenian Genocide filed in the US

22 July 2019
Turkish Ministry of Interior’s order to send Syrians back to their registered cities

**SEPTEMBER**

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

**NOVEMBER**

Gas and oil exploration operations in the Mediterranean Sea

**MAY**

6 May 2019
Decision to repeat Istanbul mayoral election

**FEBRUARY**

6 February 2019
France’s Declaration of 24 April as “the Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day” in France

26 February 2019
Anniversary of Khojaly Massacre

**MARCH**

8 March 2019
International Women’s Day

15 March 2019
Racist attacks on two mosques in New Zealand

31 March 2019
Local elections

**APRIL**

24 April 2019
Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day

**MAY**

6 May 2019
Decision to repeat Istanbul mayoral election

**JUNE**

Tensions between Turkey and Southern Cyprus over natural resource exploration in the Mediterranean Sea

**AUGUST**

30 August 2019
Victory Day

**OCTOBER**

9 October 2019
The Operation Peace Spring

29 October 2019
US House of Representatives’ passing of resolution that recognizes the Armenian Genocide

**DECEMBER**

Violations of human rights of refugees on the Greek border

Christmas and New Year celebrations

**JULY**

11 July 2019
Anniversary of Srebrenica Massacre

19 July 2019
Anniversary of “Cyprus Peace Operation” trials for damages against Turkey over confiscated property during and after the Armenian Genocide filed in the US

22 July 2019
Turkish Ministry of Interior’s order to send Syrians back to their registered cities

**SEPTEMBER**

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

**NOVEMBER**

Gas and oil exploration operations in the Mediterranean Sea
**JULY**

17 January 2019
Anniversary of Srebrenica Massacre

19 January 2019
Anniversary of “Cyprus Peace Operation” trials for damages against Turkey over confiscated property during and after the Armenian Genocide filed in the US

22 July 2019
Turkish Ministry of Interior’s order to send Syrians back to their registered cities

**SEPTEMBER**

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

**AUGUST**

30 August 2019
Victory Day

**OCTOBER**

9 October 2019
The Operation Peace Spring

29 October 2019
US House of Representatives’ passing of resolution that recognizes the Armenian Genocide

**DECEMBER**

Violations of human rights of refugees on the Greek border

Christmas and New Year celebrations

**NOVEMBER**

Gas and oil exploration operations in the Mediterranean Sea

**MARCH**

8 March 2019
International Women’s Day

15 March 2019
Racist attacks on two mosques in New Zealand

31 March 2019
Local elections

**MAY**

6 May 2019
Decision to repeat Istanbul mayoral election

**JULY**

11 July 2019
Anniversary of Srebrenica Massacre

19 July 2019
Anniversary of “Cyprus Peace Operation” trials for damages against Turkey over confiscated property during and after the Armenian Genocide filed in the US

22 July 2019
Turkish Ministry of Interior’s order to send Syrians back to their registered cities

**JUNE**

Tensions between Turkey and Southern Cyprus over natural resource exploration in the Mediterranean Sea

**MAY**

6 May 2019
Decision to repeat Istanbul mayoral election

**JUNE**

Tensions between Turkey and Southern Cyprus over natural resource exploration in the Mediterranean Sea

**APRIL**

24 April 2019
Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTENT PER TARGETED GROUPS

Considering the analyzed items, we obtain the following table on the distribution of content per targeted groups who have more than 30 items of hate speech against them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cypriot Greeks and/or Greeks of Turkey</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the British</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerners</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the French</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Muslims</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbians</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudis</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atheists</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelists</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2019, Armenians were

- portrayed as enemies in texts covering the Khojaly Massacre and April 24 Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, in association with violence and massacre,
- identified with terrorism through being mentioned in association with PKK and ASALA,
- targeted in news articles and commentaries on disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia,
- portrayed as enemies in texts covering Baku’s inclusion in Azerbaijan, through association with violence and massacre,
- associated with violence in the narratives of the Turkish War of Independence,
- labeled as the force behind “hostile” groups and persons,
- portrayed as enemies in reference to past events, in news articles and commentaries on the US Senate’s passing of the resolution that recognizes the Armenian Genocide;

Syrian refugees were

- Systematically associated with criminal actions such as murder, theft and harassment, and thus coded as potential criminals and identified with security concerns and ‘terrorism’,
- targeted because of their presence in Turkey, in articles and columns on “Operation Olive Branch”,
- blamed for unfavorable economic conditions and unemployment in Turkey,
- labeled as a “threat” against Turkey’s demographic structure and generally as a source of unease and “tension”;

Greeks were

- presented as enemy with reference to tensions in the Kardak Islets,
- portrayed as enemies in reference to past events,
- presented as a threat against Turks in news articles and columns about Cyprus,
- portrayed as enemies due to gas and oil exploration operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
- held responsible as a society for human rights violations against refugees along the Greek-Turkish border;
Jews were
- identified with violence and portrayed as enemies in articles covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and tensions in Al-Aqsa Mosque,
- targeted by using Jewish identity in a generalizing manner instead of referring to persons/institutions with such terms as “Israeli state”, “Israel” or “Israeli Defense Forces”,
- portrayed as the hidden power in conspiracy theories and presented as a threat against Turkey,
- associated with many persons and institutions that are mentioned with negative references in the media,
- defamed using references to Jewish identity as an expression of insult,
- associated with violence in articles reporting on the interventions in the Great March of Return;

Cypriot Greeks and/or Greeks in Turkey were
- targeted in discussions about gas exploration in the Mediterranean Sea,
- associated with violence and massacre in reference to past clashes in Cyprus, in the news articles and columns covering the 45th anniversary of “the Cyprus Peace Operation” and the 36th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus;

Christians were
- targeted and marginalized in articles and columns about Christmas and New Year celebrations,
- associated with terrorism and violence because of the attacks on two mosques in New Zealand,
- presented as a threat against Turkey’s national interest and security through “Operation Peace Spring”,
- targeted by way of defining the EU and European countries with which Turkey has problems on the basis of Christian identity;

the British were
- presented as a part of conspiracy theories and portrayed as an enemy of Muslim identity,
- associated with violence as a society in narratives of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence;
Westerners were
- presented as a threat against Turkey’s national interests and security and associated with terrorism during “Operation Peace Spring”,
- targeted by way of holding all of western society responsible for the crises with the EU, European countries, and the US;

the French were
- associated with violence and massacre as a society in narratives of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence,
- portrayed as an enemy in texts dealing with disagreements and political differences between Turkey and France;

Arabs were
- targeted by way of associating Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic moves with Arab identity,
- presented as a threat against Turkey’s national interest and security in reference to past events,
- targeted through defining Syrians with Arab identity in articles and columns.
The groups subjected to hate speech in less than 30 items are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Italians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Afghans, deists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Iraqis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Iranians, Pakistanis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fins, New Zealanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Austrians, Belgians, the Spanish, Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Georgians, the Dutch, Houthi people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Albanians, Azerbaijanis, Cherkes people, the Danish, Indians, Slavs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Africans, Alevi, Argentinians, Australians, Teutonics, the Czech, Easterners, Philippians, Hutu people, Icelanders, Qatari, Kyrgyzistanis, Libyans, the Lebanese, Hungarians, Malaysians, Judaists, Muslims, Norwegians, Middle Easterners, Orthodox Christians, Uzbeks, the Bagratuni, the Portuguese, Protestants, the Roma, the Sudanese, Syriacs, Taciqis, Turkistanis, Vlachs, Yemenis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CONTENT PER TYPE, NEWSPAPER AND CATEGORY

Excluding the repeated items, items analyzed in 2019 consist of 2160 columns and 2099 news articles. Media archive pages, files, articles published in the readers’ pages, book reviews/evaluations and similar items were analyzed under the title of “other”; hate speech was found in 105 items under this category.

![Graph 2: Hate speech per type](image)

- **columns**: %49.30
- **news articles**: %47.91
- **other**: %2.40

![Graph 3: Hate speech in national and local press](image)

- **national**: %49
- **local**: %51

*graph 2: Hate speech per type*

*graph 3: Hate speech in national and local press*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Yeni Akit</td>
<td>263</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yeniçağ</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diriliş Postası</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Gazete</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milat</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Şafak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
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<td>Türkgü'n</td>
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<td>Star</td>
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<td>Önce Vatan</td>
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<td>Doğru Haber</td>
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<td>Ortadoğu</td>
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*graph 4: Hate speech in national press*
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Graph 5: Hate speech in local press

Local newspapers generated hate speech in 15 or fewer items are not included in the graph. For the full list: rebrand.ly/2019hatespeech
Graph 6: Distribution of newspaper containing the largest number of hate speech according to the groups they targeted most.
Instances of hate speech in newspapers are analyzed in accordance with four categories:

- exaggeration/attribution/distortion
- swearing/insult/defamation
- enmity/war discourse
- symbolization

These categories are determined in order to help understand and distinguish between different types of hate speech. In the case of identifying more than one category in the same item, the dominant category is regarded for the sake of classification.
In the title and various parts of the article, the attacker is referred to as a “Christian terrorist”, associating Christian identity with violence and massacre. With the emphasis on his Christian identity, combined with the fact that the murderer targeted Muslims, a sentiment of enmity between Muslim and Christian identities is formed. Moreover, in the subsection entitled “Inspired by the Norwegian killer” based on the account of the attacker, Norwegian identity is associated with violence with reference to a previous attack carried out in Norway.

How could it have been written?

**title suggestion:** Hateful attack on a mosque in New Zealand: Almost 50 Muslims killed

The problem of increasing hateful attacks might have been pointed out by highlighting the hateful motivation of the attacks in the title instead of emphasizing the perpetrator’s religious identity.
Yeni Zelanda’da alcak saldırı... Teröristler cuma namazı sırasında Hristiyan teröristlerce silahlı saldırı düzenlendi. 49 Müslüman kardeşimizin şehit olduğu terör saldırıının ardından 4 kişi yakalandı. Erdoğan, katliamla ilgili olarak “Dünyada yükselşen seyredilen ve hatta teşvik edilen İslam düşmanlığı, bireysel taciz çizgisini geçerek toplu katliam boyutuna ulaşmıştır” diye konuştu.
In the article, the statements of historian Yavuz Bahadırlıoğlu are used in the headline without quotation marks. By using Bahadırlıoğlu’s remark in the main headline, the newspaper codes the British as a threat to Turkey and provokes the reader against them.
In the column, past sentiments of enmity against Armenians are reinforced by repeated use of provocative depictions of violence as we see in the following sentences: “Again in this village, Armenians put several Muslim children into piles of turf and then set it on fire; they burned these poor innocent children alive (…)”, “Armenians set aside children under the age of 15 and then killed them with bayonets,” and “An Armenian took our neighbor Firdevs’ son and martyred him by breaking him in half through his legs.” The columnist demonizes Armenians with remarks containing elements of enmity and hatred.
In the column, Buddhist, Chinese, Jewish and Christian identities are associated with violence and massacre, as we see in the following sentence: “I mean, we want to say this: The blood of our most sacred ones shouldn’t be cheap. We are in a century where Muslim blood is very cheap. Why? Why are non-believers so reckless, while idolatrous Buddhists and Chinese on one side, Jews and Christians on the other side are attacking children of the Islamic community like rabid dogs? How can we explain this?” Thus, the columnist represents Buddhists, the Chinese, Jews and Christians as a threat to Muslims, and foments enmity against them.
Şubat Şehadet ve İnkılap Ayıdır


Şehit, uğruna kurbanı olmağı Rabbinin kavuşmanı kıyma zaman Hz. Hüseyin gibi ‘Şehadet bize genç kızın gerdanlığı gibidir.’ diyerek ifade eder. Çünkü şehitler, bilirler ki şehitler, ‘İnsanoğunun ulaşabileceği en ucuz kalabalık ve makamıdır.


Der ve bu yaşlı amca kendini halkalar halinde Allah’ın zikreden bir topluluk içinde bulur ve topluluk cezbede olan zikrine katılır. Demek bizim yaşlı amca o kadar kendini kaptırmış ki hanımı can kısıtığı zanneder. ‘Bey! Bey! Uyan! Ne oluyor! Allah’ım...’ sesleriyle yaşlı amcayi uyanır. Uyanında hamnına kazar: ‘Yahu birakmadın mı şehitlerle Allah’ın zikredelim!’ Der ve rüyasını ağlayarak anlatır.

This front page article, with its title choice, represents Cypriot Greeks and/or Greeks in Turkey as a threat to Turkey, fomenting negative sentiments about and enmity against them.
The article’s summary reads: “It is time to build a Khojaly Genocide monument in Northern Cyprus in order to remember the atrocity and genocide carried out by Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh against our helpless and innocent kin just because they were Turkish, to pass it on to the next generations and to commemorate it for all time, because we are the ones who can understand them.” With this type of discourse, the perception of enmity against Armenians is reinforced. The columnist demonizes Armenian identity with remarks containing elements of enmity and hatred, and foments enmity between peoples.
In this column, discussing the opposition parties’ ways of opposing, the author writes: “I regret to say it but the political parties in our country give lots of material to the giaour when they try to oppose and criticize the government and its practices,” and “You have the right to oppose. We respect that. But you shouldn’t do it by pushing the buttons of this country and with a political discourse that strengthens the giaour’s hand or by humiliating before the giaour this great nation which you want to rule.” As we see, with the word ‘giaour’, which is used as an expression of hatred and insult for non-Muslims in Turkey, the perception of enmity against non-Muslim identities is reinforced. Moreover, Jewish identity is used as a reference to treachery and enmity: “I happened to listen to a scumbag called ENES KANTER on an American channel. At first, I didn’t catch his name or I forgot it, so I thought he was a JEW. But he turned out to be a Turkish traitor.” Greek identity is also used as a reference of enmity in a similar way: “Even Greek giaours who attempt to occupy [Turkey] haven’t done as much harm as these scumbags who spy and work against this country to gain worldly possessions.” Thus, in the column, enmity against non-Muslims, Jews, and Greeks is fomented.
MUHALEFET EDİN AMA...

Çok ama çok üzülen bir gerçekçi ifade etmek zorundayız.

O da şudur:

Bizim ülkemiz siyasi partiler muholefet edeyim, Hükümeti ve icraati- ni eleştireyim derken elin gavuruna her gün dosyalar dolusu malzeme üretiliyor.

Bu böyle olmamalıdır.

Ankara'da Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi kürsüsünden uunken çıkalar- lari, geleceği, güvenliği ve esenliği için yapılan her şeyi ayır bir dile ifa- de etmek, böyle Brüksele, Bonn'a Londra’ya, hatta İsrail’e malzeme üretemek nasıl bir sürüşsuzluk? Türkiye’nin yedi düvelle mücadele etmeye mecbur olduğu bir dö- nemi, Washington'da kurdukları FETÖ Lojisiyle aynı dili kullanmak bizdeki müzim Muhafızların na- sil işlerine siniriyor ve aynı çizgide siyaset yapıyorlar anlamak mümkün değil.

FETÖ’cü vatandaş haini kaçaılar mil- yon Dolarlar hacıyör Türkiye aleyhi- ne faaliyetleri için. Amerikanın en önemli televizyon kanallarından Türkiye aleyhinin konuşması yapıyor.

Bu çalışmalarıdırı de doğduğu bu topraklarda Ahmet, Mehmet, Hasan ya da HHayat’ın olarak konulunmuş sankı.


Amerikan Kongresi ya da Temsil- ciler Mecelisi konulardırında çoğunu- ğu yahudi kökenli ülkeye Türkiye aleyhine malzeme içeriği sunan ve bunu alını yapan alcak FETO’cülerin bir işi olduğu bilinir.

İnsan istemeye dâbiiyör. Bu ülkede böylesine vatandaş haini alcak- lığa tevessül edecik mahluklar nasıl türedi diye.

Dünya mali ve serveti edinmek için bu ülke aleyhinin casusluk yapan ve faaliyet gösteren bu şefeslerin verdiği zararla ülkeyi bir tarhtı iş- gale kalkışan Yunan davası bile yap- mamiş ve yapmamaktadır.

Bu ihanetleri yapanlar bir kendi- lerini iyi Müslüman olarak iddia edip saftorik vatandaşlarnı hala sö- mürmeyemi devam etmeyorlar mı, inan- nin bu işe fena halde içerliyorum.

Namertiği, ihaneti, hırsızlığı, fuhu- şu danhı her çekirkinli mubah gören bu kesimin kendili hayatlarında nasıl olduklarını umurumuzda değildir. Ama bu ülke için, bu toplum için ve bu Müslüman Millet için ihanetlerini hazmetmeck kolay değil.

Düşününüz ki, maalesef bizim ül- kemizde siyaset yapan ve memleketi yöntemeye talip olanlar da asla bun- lara tek lütfen söyleyemiyor.

Tipki o hesabına PKK’nın siyasi yapsılıya ortülü ittifak yaparak seçim kazanmayı tercih eden ve gelecek için de aynı tavsi sürüdürceği gibi, -ça idan eden𫍽 café Sıyası kabulü- ğindeki aciz politikacılar gibi.

Tüm bu “ÜLKE MUHAFİZLER” ne söylemek tek söz var: Yahu muholefet etmek hakkınz- dir, Savaşırsınız, Ama bu ülkenin can damarına hançer saplayarak, elin gavuruna kendi içimizden malzeme üreten bir siyasi dile değil, Oyuna talip olduğunu ve başka geçmiş istedığıınız bu Aziz Milletin itibarını elin gavuruna karşı örsele- yerek ve malzeme İhraç ederek değil.

Aklınızı başına alın ve iktidar hir- si ve sarasıyla yaşadığınız bu toprak- lara bilmeyerek zarar vermeye de- vam etmeye.

Diliizce sahiba olan yeten, Sizden başka bir şey istemiyor bu Millet.
The column discussing the terrorist attack in New Zealand associates New Zealanders with violence by emphasizing the attacker’s national identity as we see in the title: “It turns out that the New Zealander psycho killer is obsessed with Turks,” and the remark, “Because some people among us agree with what this New Zealander psycho killer thinks about Turks.” Moreover, the person whom the murderer mentioned as his inspiration is described as the following: “Herbert Gladstone, who lived between 1809-98 and served as prime minister for 12 years, was a vicious enemy of Turks and also an Evangelist. He supported the Bulgarian revolt and Armenian terrorism, aided exiled opponents of Abdul Hamid and said in a speech ‘Turks will continue their lives by smoking their water pipes on the Asian side of the Bosporus’.” With these remarks, Armenians are associated with terrorism and the perception of enmity against this identity is fomented.
Yeni Zelandalı manyak katil biz Türklere de takınılymuş

Yeni Zelanda’daaki iki camide katıldığım yeniden yapılan Brenton Tarrant adındaki manyak katılı, biz Türklere hakkında da iyi şeyler düşünmüyor mus ya... Daha önce yayınlanlığı manifestoında, şunları yazmıştır:

“-Boğazın Doğu tarafindaki topraklarnda huzur içinde yaşayabilirsiniz, size zarar gelmeyecektir. Ama Boğazın Batı yakasında bir yerde yaşamayı denerseniz, Avrupa’ya gelerseniz sizi öldüreceğiz.

“-Konstantinopolis’ten gelir, tüm cami ve minareleri çıkarız. Ayasofya minarelerinden kurtulacak ve Konstantinopol hak edildiği gibi tekrar Hristiyan şehri olacak”

İlhamın kaynağı

Bu manyak katılı bu laflann ilhamını kimden almış olabilir diye, kısa bir araştırma yaptım kitaplar arasında... Karşıma İngiliz Başbakanı Gladstone’çıktı. 1809-98 yılları arasında yaşayan ve 12 yıl başbakanlık yapan Herbert Gladstone, azılı bir Türk düşmanıydı ve Evangelistti... Bulgar ayaklanması, Ermeni terörüne desteklemiş, Abdülbahad’ın sürüğünde muhaliflerine destek vermiş ve bir konuşmasında da “Türkler Boğaz’ın Asya yakasında nargilelerini içerek yaşamaya devam edecekler” demişti.

Zulüm ne zaman başladı?

Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın Gezi kalkışmasına duvara yazılan “Zulüm 1453’te başladı” cümlesini sık sık zikretmesi boş değildir. Çünkü Yeni Zelandalı manyak katılin biz Türklere hakkında düşündüklerini, bizim aramızdaki derlerden de paylaşanlar vardır. Ayrıca kendimize dost olarak seçliğimiz ve müteşkilimiz olarak benimsedüğümüz bazı dış ülkelerin de, her fırsatta bizi kendi dünyalarının dışlamaya çalışmalarını sık sık görmüyor muyuz?

İslamofobi

Neyse... “İslamofobi” denilen tür yobazlığın, faşizmin ve ikrîçinin nere-lerde yeşerdiğini gözden kaçırmayalım. Bu ülkeler genellikle insanlığa özgürlük ve hukuk dersi verme hakkını kendilerinde görenlerdir... Siz de merak etmiyor musunuz? Manyak katil Brenton Tarrant Türkiye’ye gelip iki aydan fazla süreyle kaldıında acaba kimlerle görüşüp, sapantılarını silaladı?

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In the article, Syrian identity is emphasized and Syrians are associated with crime, as we see in the following sentence: “The 65-year-old female victim, who wanted to find a bride for her disabled son, found a bride for 30,000 liras, went to the police to accuse of fraud the Syrian girl who fled.” The negative representation in the article renders invisible human rights violations against Syrian women and reinforces negative opinions about this identity.
In the article reporting on a social media post by a member of the Regional Council of Brittany about the terrorist attack in New Zealand, the French are insulted with an emphasis on the national identity of the person in question, and negative opinions about this identity are reinforced. How could it have been written?

**title suggestion:** Controversial reaction to the attack in New Zealand by a deputy in France

National identity should not have been emphasized in the title, insulting words for this identity should not have been used, and the article should have been written in such a way as to avoid creating prejudice. The article could have simply pointed out the dangerous effects of social media posts that legitimize hateful attacks.
In the article, Syrian children are presented as a source of threat and trouble as we see in the following statements: “Some Syrians children who pestered the life out of Gazipaşa shopkeepers went totally insane. It is claimed that a group of Syrian children between the ages of 7 and 10 are wandering around as a gang and attacked students in Gazipaşa,” and “Some Syrian children who allegedly keyed cars and stole money from cars with open windows (…)”. The article promotes a negative representation of Syrian children who are in reality deprived of many basic rights; violations of rights are made invisible, stereotypes about children are generated and the grounds for isolating them from society are legitimizied.
In the article reporting the attack on a Muslim because he was selling beef, Hindus are labeled as a threat against Muslims and negative opinions about them are fomented through generalization.
In the article, Syrian identity is emphasized in a negative manner with the summary “Two Syrians who provide health care services in their unlicensed office are caught”, although their identity is not directly related to the incident. Thus, existing prejudices against Syrians are fomented.
In the title and text of the article reporting the statements of the Israeli minister of justice, political criticism is presented with an insulting label of women’s identity; thus gender identity is turned into a political tool and misogyny is regenerated.
In the column, *Westerners are associated with massacre, assimilation, perversion, selfishness and violence, and hatred against them is incited* as we see in the following remarks: “You, the monster who disguises itself as democracy, freedom, human rights, what did you give to humanity? What did you give other than unhappiness, pessimism, all kinds of sexual and moral perversion, suicide, hunger, poverty, selfishness, impiousness?” and, “You barbarous West, your civilization is a civilization of blood, the wild Europe! Wails of those free native people, 40 million honorable Indians whom you massacred after occupying their lands, whose skulls you piled into mountains, whose scalps you used as wall decoration, whom you insulted, treated like animals and confined in camps, whose hearts are still breaking.” And with the remark “I don’t know how to describe you, you are full of crime, murder, atrocity! Aren’t you the ones who gave 8,000 innocent and defenseless people including women, children, elderly and sick to Serbian butchers in Srebrenica, Bosnia?” *Serbians are associated with crime, and prejudices against them are reinforced.*
SEVMIYORUM SENI, SENIN HER ŞEYİNDEN
TIKLISINIYORUM, VARILGİN BANDE NEFRET
UYANDIRIYOR! ÇUNKİ ADI IYİ OLAN NE VARSA
HEPSİNIN DÜŞMANLARIN. GİTTİĞİN YERE KENDİNLE
BERABER ZULMÜ GÖTÜRÜYORSUN; ADALETSİZLİĞI,
TALANı, YIKMI, ÖLÜMÜ, SÖMÜRÜYÜ, DESPOZİTİZMI
GÖTÜRÜYORSUN. VARILGıNLA BAHARLARI KIŞA, KARA
İŞÇİ ÇEVİRİYORSUN.

EY DEMOKRASI, ÖZGÜRLÜK, İNŞAN HAKLARI,
MEDENİYET MASKESİNE BİRÜMÜS ÇANAVAR,
NE VEDIN SEN İNSANLIGA, NE VEBEBİLDİN? MUT-
SUZLUKTAN, KARAMARŞIKTAN, HER TÜRLÜ ÇINİVE
AHLAKI SAKINLIK'TAN, INTIHARDAN, AÇIK VE YOK-
SUZLUKTAN, BENCİLİK'TEN, İNANÇSZİLTİZİK'TAN BAŞKA
NE VEBEBİLDİN?

HANGİ SUÇUNU SAYAYIM Kİ? HALKLARA KARŞI
İŞLEVİNİN SUÇLARDAN MI, YOKSA CENNET GIBİ
DÜNYADA, BİR BETON VE DEMİ GÖRÜNİMİ ÇEVER-
DİĞİN O GÜZELİM DOĞAYA KARŞI İŞLEVİN SUÇ-
LARDAN MI BEŞHEDEYİM... SUÇ DOSYAN O KADAR
KABAR KI.

SENİ NASIL ANLATSAM BILEMİYORUM, HER TARA-
FINDAN SUÇ, CİNAVET, VAHŞET AKIYOR! BOSNADı,
SREBRENİÇADA KADIN, ÇOCUK, İHTİYAR, HASTA TAM
SEKİZ BIN SAVUNMASIZ, MASUM İNSANI SİRî KAP-
SAPLARINA KURBAN ETMELERİ İÇİN HEDİYEN EDEN
SEN DEĞİL MIYİDİN? SENİN NEDEN OLDUĞUN,
DOYMAK MILZEM SÖMÜRÜ HİRSTİN NEDEN OLDU-
ĞU SAVAŞTA, ÖLÜMÜN ÇAĞA KAÇAN KADIN
VE ÇOCUKLARIN, BEBEKLERİN İÇİNDE BULUﻨU
BOTAN, SANDALLAR SİRTTARAK BATIRAN, O MASUM
YAVRULARIN AZGİN OGYANUS TARAFINDAN YUTULMA-
SINI SEVINÇLİ GÖZLERLE SEYREDEN VAHSİLER SENİN
ÇOCUKLARIN DEĞİL MIYİDER?

SENİN UYGARLIĞINA KAN UYGARLIĞIDİR EY BARBAR
BATI, EY VAHŞI AVRUPA! CENNET GIBİ VATANLARINI
İŞGAL EDİP SOYKIRMAN'DAN ÇEVRİDİĞİN, KAFATAS-
RİNDAN DAĞLAR YAPTİĞİN, KAFADA DERİLERİNE SOYUP
SÜS DİYE EVINDE ASTIĞIN, AŞAĞILADIĞIN, HAYVAN-
DAN SADÎĞİN, KAMPLARDA YASAMAYA MAHKÜM
ETTİĞİN, ASİMLAYA UÇĞATTIĞİN O ÖZGÜR YER-
LILERİN, ONUR SAHİBİ KIRK MİLYON KIZİRLERİ'NİN
ACIKLı FERYADı ASİRLAR GECMESINE RAĞMEN YÜ-
REKLERI KANATMAYA DEVARı EDİYOR.

YA DEMOKRASI VE ÖZGÜRLÜK ADINA İSGAL
ETTİİĞİN İSLAM TOPRAKLAR, FITNÊYÊ VE İÇ SAVAŞ
DÜŞÜRDÜĞÜN ÜLKELER; DÜNYA NELER ÇEKİYOR
SENDEN, VARILGİN NASIL DA BİR KARABAN OLmuş
HALKLARIN GÖZünde. AL SANA ÇECENİSTAN, SOMA-
Lİ, SUĐAN, MSIR, AFGHANISTAN, İRAK, SURİYE, KEŞ-
MİR, PAKISTAN, KÜRTİSTAN, LIBYA, FİLİSTİN, YEMEN
VE Daha NICEleri... NERde ELİN VARSA ORDA KAN,
ZULUM, SÖMÜRÜ, YOKSUZLUK, İFSAT, FITNE, ACİ VE
MUTSUZLUK VAR!

Sadece bunlar mı? Ahlak da mahvettin
sen, aileyi, nesilleri, halkların geleceğini yok-
lüğa mahkûm ettin.

Kendine bile insafın yok! Bak kendine, yurt
edindiğin topraklara, sahip olduğun nesillerı,
evlatlarına... Yetiştirdiğin nesiller kendi ne-
fisterine tapınıмонтаж başka bir şey bilmenyen
zavallı robotlara döndüler. Ruhusuz, ahlaksız,
maneviyatsız, sevgisiz, acımasız, bencil birer
robot...

Ya yurt edindiğin topraklar... Allahin lut-
fettiiği doğa harikası topraklarına susuz, çorak,
ormansız, ağacısız, yaşantımsız, havasız, kirli bir
çoçüğe döndürün. Şehirlerini birer demir ve
cimento ağrıına çevirdin. Havayı, suyu, doğa-
yı o kadar kirlettin ki birkaç nesil sonra belki
dünya insan hayatı için artık yaşamaya uygun
olumayın bir yer haline gelecek.

Yeter artık ey Avrupa, yeter! Al o iğrenç
uygarlığının başına şaf Kültürünle, değerle-
rinle, sahte kavramlarına nereye cehennem
oluyorsan olt! Yeter ki düş insanları, nesilleri
yakasındı! Artık senin varlığın taahhümlü
kalmadı insanların, toplumların.

Dünyayı cehenneme çevirmen, insanlığı
uçurumdan yokluğu göndermeden, bu gezegeni
yıkıma ugratmadan git! Artık insanların
senden alacakları hiçbir şeyleri yok, hiçbir şey!
Ve senin yalanlarına, sahta vaatlerine, çutesi
kavramlarına kanacak kimse de kalmadı.

O iğrenç, barbar uygarlığının tarihin tozlul
sayfalarında unutulma zamanı geldi, geçiyor
bile...
In the article reporting on the US President Donald Trump’s statements, his words are con- doned by using them in the title without quotation marks, in large font size, and negative opinions about Jews are reinforced.
The article reporting HDP deputies’ statements on April 24 has a title that uses Armenian identity as a reason for hatred; Armenians are targeted and existing enmity against Armenians is fomented.

**title suggestion:** Deputies Kemalbay and Çepni call for the genocide to be faced

Covering the deputies’ statements and calling for facing the genocide would be enough instead of presenting this call with a criticism like “They spoke like Armenians”, which is vague in terms of who thinks or says that. Moreover, the deputies’ opinions could have been asked and discussions about this issue could have been covered.
In the column, negative opinions about Greeks and Syrians are fomented: “You gave our islands in the Aegean to the Greeks, you let 5 million Syrians dance the halay in Taksim on New Year’s Eve, you let 700,000 Syrians who could fight in a war fool around on Florya beach, you let them smoke water pipe and also make our people pay for it, you send the poor kids of this country to Syria to fight, you make paid military service permanent letting the rich live and the poor die, you spend 40 billion dollars for Syrians in Turkey while seizing prosthetics of our veterans…” The columnist targets Syrian refugees by portraying them as a social and economic threat.
Yılmaz ÖZDİL
yzdl@ezozcu.com.tr

Tweet atani tutuklayacaksin yumruk atani bırakacaksin!

Varlığıyla onur duygumuuz Musa Kart’ı karikatür çizdi diye hayse takacaksin... Televisyona çıkar “sivileri oldurmuş” Etiler’den Changir’in Nişantaşı’ndan başlapsı” diyen serbest bırakılsın.

* Karnıyar bile incitmeyle modaçı Barbaros Şansal’ın apronu döve döve tutuklayacaksin... “Seçim süreci istedimiz gibi olmasa, Belgrad Ormanı’nda ağac dibinde, talim şeyimiizi olaya gómuduk, çıkacakçağız sokağa” diyene, dokunmayacaksin.

* Gezi Park’ı’nda duran adam’ı yakalayacaksin... Palaya saldıran sokağa salılsın.

* Kadına şiddetle dur demek için pankart açan kuzara kelepe takacaksin... Şort gióyör diye kuzçağaza tekme atana karşıyacaktı.

* Deniz Çakır’ın “başörtülü kuzara haket etti” palavrasıyla hapis cezası isteyeceksin... Mühalek anamız Zibeyde Hanım’a “geneleye de Soma’dan 301 madencimizi katladden şirkinin yönetim kurulu başkanı Can Gürkan’ı serbest bırakılsın, katledilen madencilerin gömülü avlulati Selçuk Kozakçı’yi terörist diye hayse atılsın.

* Terör örgütüyle Oslo’da nüfuz otoruca olan PKK’ya tanık TSK’ya sank yapacaksin, genelkurmay başkanını terörist ilan edeceksin, mermi skhidan Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’ni esir alacaksin, yurterse subayları imha edeceksin, İmralı’yla Kandil arasında kuryelik yapacaksin, tüm formaltı teröristleri Habur’da daval zurnaya karşılatılsın, otobüsün üstünde sehir turu attracaksin, Apo’ya Diyarbakır meydandına ulusa sesleniş konusunu yapacaksin.

* Murat Karaylan’ın Kandil’deki basın toplantısını canlı yayınaçaksin, “Türk Bayrakı demeyelim Türküyeli bayrıa diyelim” diyecesin, “PKK seçme giriş” diyen milletvekili yapacaksin, “Türk kilmılı bölücüdür” diyene başlayın yapacaksin, TC’yi sikeceksin, PKK bayrağı tasımaya suç 

* Hàyatımızı Türkiye’yeye adamaş olan Müjdät Gezen’i “aman ha yurduşsun kaça seçin” diyey karakola irza vermeeye göndericeksin... Müjdät Gezen’in olayını kundaklayın yobaz, evine göndericeksin.

* Demokrasi tarifi yapan Metin Akpınar’i “halkı hukümete karşı silahlı isyana teşvik etmek” tari yarışlayacaksin... Ulucanlar Müzesi’nde darboğacının öndenden yırtına yapar “karşınmüz Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’nun idam edilmesini, asılsınmaz bekleyor” diyen medya cellulon, ilsmeyeceksin.

* Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi ilahiyat fakültesi öğretim üyesinin, “1924 te camiler kapatılın, Çanakkale ve Bursa da genelev olarak kullanılan camiler var” demesine “basın özgürlüğü” diyecesin, “ifade özgürlüğü kapsamında” diyecesin...

* Değerli ağabeyim Üzeyir Dündar’ın Halk Arenası’ni kapatılsın, namusu habercilik yapan Fox Haber’i hakai kaleceksiniz.

* Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin komzim odasına giren fotocaları aktaracaksunuz...

* Esrem İmamoğlu’nun kılınle para dağıtımı dağıtırarak... üzere İstanbul büyüşehir belediyesinin dijital verilerini kayt alta alınması mahkeme kararını yaşamayacaksan.

* Riza Sarraf’la haysıver... Türk Bayrağı’nın önüne vatan kurtaran kahraman gibi poz verdireceksin... Osman Kavala’ya müebbet isteyeceksin.

* olmaktan çıkarakılsın, Şivan Perver’e düşt yapıpın, takvimde başka gün kalımayız gibi tam 29 Ekim de Cumhuriyet Bayramı’nda Kürdistan silahlı kuvvetlerine Türkiye toplarla arasında resmi geçit yapacaksan, Kobani’ye giden Kürdistan silahlı kuvvetlerine Türkiye’nin bayrak taşıyıcı THY uçaklarınıyla taşyacakın, Barzani’yi onur konuşu yapacaksin, Türkiye seminle gurur duyuyor sloganlarıyla alanı açacaksan, Ankara’nın göbeğine Kürdistan bayrağı çekicerekin, vatan toprağını terkederceksin, Süleyman Şah Türkiye’nde boy sanduklarını sırtlayıp kaçırsan, Ege deki adamlarımı Yurun’a peşkeş çekecesin, beş milyon Surije’yi yıla başında Taksim’dedir halay çekicerek... askerlik çağdırı 700 bin Surije’yi Floras’ın plajında gottünü gezdiricerek, nargile içicerek... içciker nargilerin pazarı gibi be millete oletecek... be milletin gariban çocuklarını Surije’lierin yerine Surije’ye vurusmayınforderceksin... ense kuşku ara così sajolsun, garibansa vatanı sajolsun diyerek bedelli askerliği sürekli halie getirecek... Türkiye’deki Surije’li 40 milyar doları harç Размер, gazilerimizin proteziyle be yaz göndericeksin, şehit babasına hapis cezası vereceksin... Bunları aktaracaksan... Kılıçdaroğlu shet cazesine gidince “teröristlerin ortağı” diye saldıracaksan, ilççe edecesin.

* Asır liderizim hakkında ‘tweet atani’ tutuklayacaksin... CHP genel başkanına “yumruk atani” serbest bırakılsın.

* Nalçıcı keseri iyidir ama... Keser döner sap döner, unutmayacaksan.
In the article reporting on Israel’s attacks in the West Bank, Jewish identity is held responsible for the attacks perpetrated by Israel security forces. Thus, enemy against Jews is reinforced.

How could it have been written?

title suggestion: *Israel attacks Gaza: There are casualties*

The reported attack could have been associated with the responsible state/government and violations of rights and crimes in the region could have been emphasized.
İsrail ile Gazze arasındaki sınır çatışmalarının üçüncü gününde İsrail'in saldırıları sonucu biri anne karnında 7 Filistinli şehit oldu.

Gazze'den roket atılmasi sonucunda bir İsrailinin de öldüğü belirtildi. Öte yandan İsrail savaş uçaklarının Gazze'de bir camiyi bombaladı, bombardımda 3 Filistinli yaralandı.

İsrail'in Gazze'de saldırılarında biri anne karnında 7 Filistinli şehit oldu

Yahudi kudurdu


birificate öneleri sununun 7'e yükseldiğini, yaratılanın savununun ise 50'a çıktığını duydu. Gazze sınırında 22 yaşındaki İsmail Muhammed Nasir, Gazze'nin değil kısmında 2,5 yaşındaki Sabi Muna, 3, 6 yaşındaki Salih Abu Arab ve daha anne bini larının varuk kıyak verildiğini açıkladı. İsrail'in Gazze sınırında gece boyunca sonerler çaldı. İsrail ordusunun, Gazze'den atılan roketlerin haya savunma sistemlerini tarafından imha edildiğini anlattı bir roketin Aşkelon tarafından bir eve isabet ettiğini ve bir İsrail vatandaşının öldürgünü açıkladı.
With the title based on the word “giaour”, which is used as an expression of hatred and insult against non-Muslims in Turkey, rooted negative sentiments about non-Muslims are reinforced. With the remark “This herd of murderers is united by the fact that this band of murderers are all heretics” and through the “us-versus-them” division dominant in the overall discourse of the column, non-Muslims are portrayed as enemies.
GÂVUR GÂVURU TUTAR

Yarasalar hoşlanmıyor diye güneş doğmasını mı? Sinekler, külüktü beslenen, güller açmasını, havalar gülkökmasını diye bağırsalar güller açmasını mı?

Göründü teş difícği iemandan, aslan görmüş eşek gibi kaçaçlarla uyum sağlamaya, diyalog toplantları yapmaya çalışanlar da anladığı karşındakinin neden kaçığını.

Suriye’de kursanara bir bakınız. Trump, Putin ve Netanyahu’nun askerleri.
Ölenler, ne tarafta olursa olsun hepsi Müslüman.
İrak’ta bir buçuk milyon Müslüman, Ame- rikali askerler tarafından öldürüldüler.
Suriye’de binlerce Müslüman Rus askerleri tarafından öldürüldüler.
Ölenlerin hepsi, doğru veya yanlış mes- replerden olsalar da öldürülmeleri nedenleri Müslüman olmalıdır.
Ölenlerin alınan actır. Çünkü sahip olduklarını iman, her türlü yaniştan, şirken paktır.
A kılığın, paklık birilerinin karası, kara- lanı, içlerin dışa vurduğu gostereyordu ve onun için öldürüldü.
Çıtırın aynaysı kırması gibi, kirdi Müslüman’ın.

Ellî yıl soğuk sağavıştığını söyleyen Amerika ile Rusya’nın yine içten içe birbirini çökerme çalışmalan devam ederken, birlikte Müslüman avına çıkma çalışmalan karanjıklanın, karanjlık planlarının aynı yerden kaynak-landığını gösterdi.

Şaşmayalım. Her şey cinsine çeker.
Keklikle karganın birlikte oludüğünü gören adam, şaşırm ve bunlar bir araya gelmesini diye yalanla doğru gödcine iliksinin de topal olduğunu görür.
Bu katiller sürüsünü bir araya getiren de katiller guruhunun hepsinin kâfiirlikte birleş- meleridir.

Hazzaf Aise anamasız yanna gelen bir Mekkeli kadın onu epeye Sullivan.
Medine’de sakaci bir cadının müsafiri ol- duğunu öğrenince şu hadisi rivayet eder:

“Ruhlar toplanmış ordular gübürler. Tanışinanları üfet ederler, tanışmâ- yanlar ihtilaf ederler.” (Buhari Enbiya 3, Müslüman bir 159 160, Ebu Davud edep 16, Ahmet, Müned 2/295, 527, 537) Beyha- ki’nin Şub-ül İmanında (Cilt 6, sayı 497) Abdullah bin Mesud rivayetinde:

“Bir mümin, mescide gelse, mescitte yüz münafık ve bir tane de mümin olsun, o bir kişi- yi tanımadığ halde onun yanına oturur.

Bir münafık, bir mescide gelse orada yüz mümin ve bir tek münafık olsa o bir tek mü- nafığın tanımadığı halde onun yanına oturur” (İbni Abdil Berr, el’Temhid, Isbahanı, emsâlılı hadis. “Hadisin senedinde zayıflik vardır” di- yenler var.)

Hz. Ömer, Hz. Ali’ye sordu:


Dünyadaki bütün Müslümanların kardeş biler- lerek şehit olmak, Be yaz Saray’dan veya Kızıl Saray’dan ipek halılar üstünde, altın koltuklar üzerinde dünyayı pusu kurarken yaşamaktan trilyon kere trilyon kere daha fazla şeylerdir.

Çünkü her can ölçümü tadacaktır ve yapti- çının karşılığını bulacaktır.
In the article covering the report in the European Commission Enlargement Package, the report’s criticisms against several issues such as Turkey’s drilling operations in the Mediterranean and the renewal of the mayoral election in Istanbul are defined as “the Cypriot Greeks and/or Greeks in Turkey talking” in the article, presenting Greek identity as “enemy.” Thus, negative opinions and enmity against Greeks is fomented.
The article claims that a group tried to lynch Turks during a protest in Southern Cyprus demanding the opening of Varosha quarter, which has been closed since 1974. With the title and content, the article reinforces negative opinions about Cypriot Greeks and/or Greeks in Turkey and foments the perception of enmity about their identity.
In the article, with remarks “Germans are afraid because Turkish tourism capital Antalya broke the record of tourist numbers in a season!” and “Starting to publish materials targeting tourism in Turkey, Germans also published things targeting Turkey and President Erdoğan”, Germans are labeled as an “enemy” of Turkey and the perception of enmity against the identity is reinforced.
Türkiye'nin Başarısı
Almanları Korkuttu!

Türkiye'nin turizm başkenti Antalya'da tüm zamanların turist rekorunun kırılması Almanları korkuttu!

Türkiye turizmini hedef alan yayınlar yapmaya başlayan Almanlar, Türkiye'yi ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ı hedef alan yayınları imza attı. FETÖ terör örgütünün adeta yuvası durumuna gelen Almanyaya, her fırsatta Türkiye'ye yönelik saldırıların yayınlarına devam ediyor. Türkiye'nin Turizmde rekorlar kirdiği bu günlerde ise turizmi hedef alan yayınlar yapan Alman medyası, Türkiye'ye ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'a hakaret sayılabilecek yayınlara imza attı. TÜRİSTE ALGI OPERASYONU YAPTILAR!

The article makes the inference that Syrian refugees in Turkey share in the income of the retired based on the following claim: “The government fed Syrians with the money that should be used for giving a well-earned raise to the retired. President Erdoğan said, ‘We spent 37 billion dollars for Syrians.’ According to the current exchange rate, 37 billion dollars make 212 billion Turkish liras. With this money, a 738 lira raise can be given to 12 million retirees, and this amount could be paid for 2 years.” Using information without adequate context, the article labels Syrian refugees’ presence as an “economic threat” and targets Syrian identity.
In the article covering a commentary published in a weekly newspaper on drilling operations in the Mediterranean Sea, negative opinions about Armenian identity are reinforced and the perception of enmity is fomented.
Syrian refugees are accused of “ungratefulness” with the title and the remark “We gave food and jobs to 4 million Syrians, but look what they have done.” Moreover, this accusation is supported by the selected images (a protest banner calling for support for refugees, a photograph that is claimed to be depicting a Syrian and an illustration allegedly drawn by a Syrian). The article states, “Turkey embraced millions of Syrians who escaped from the civil war. These lands became a cozy home and provided subsistence for them. However, an illustration by a Syrian named Moustafa Jacoub who went to the US was enough. He turned the crescent in the Turkish flag into the mouth of a monster and the star into people running away. And he shared this ugly image with the caption ‘Syrian refugees in Turkey.’” An opposition between Syrian and Turkish identities is formed by positioning Turks as “compassionate hosts” as opposed to the “ungratefulness” attributed to Syrians. Furthermore, Syrians are targeted with the use of a deputy’s statement “Syrians made the cities inhabitable” as a subheading. While the entire article presents Syrian refugee presence in Turkey as a problem, it also targets Syrians by accusing them of being “ungrateful” to Turkey.
İSTANBUL VALİLİĞİ’NDEN SONRA SÜLEYMAN SOYLU DA AÇIKLABI:

Her Suriyeli, oturum belgesinde yazan şehirde yaşayacak

İstanbul’dan 540 bin Suriyeli olduğunu hatırlatan Soylu, kaçak olanların şehirden gitmemesi halinde, sorunların kontrol edilemez bir noktaya gelebileceğini söyledi.

İstanbul Valiliği’nin kaçak yaşayan Suriyelilerle ilgili alacaklarını duyurduğu öne min ardından bir açıklama da İçişleri Bakanı Süleyman Soylu’dan geldi. Hatırlanacağı gibi İstanbul Valiliği, geçici koruma kapsamında olsa bile İstanbul’a kayıtlı olmayan Suriyelilere 20 Ağustos tarihine kadar süre vermişti. Valilik, bu tarihten sonra yakalanacak Suriyelilerin katılarakan şehirlerle göndereceğini duyurdu.

İKTIŞADIN GÜNDEMİNDE

Katıldığını bir toplantıda, İstanbul’daki kaçak Suriyelilerin devletin gündemine girdiğini belirtti. Soylu,ที่มี(144,101),(817,122)

This article reports on an article published in a Saudi Arabian newspaper. While the article in question is defined as “anti-Turk”, this “enmity” is attributed to all Saudis, and all the bearers of Saudi identity are coded as enemies.
In the column, discriminatory generalizations about Syrians are made and all Syrians are associated with crime, as we see in the following remark: “Today, there are covered women with veils and men with beards and thobes called Syrians wandering around in our country. During holidays, they return to their country and stay there for days, and then come back to Turkey. Since they can stay in their country for days, they do not need to stay in our country. And this is not racism. We know that Syrians are involved in prostitution, robbery, plunder and murder incidents in our country. We also know that their population increases rapidly due to their birth rate. In Hatay and Kilis, the Syrian population grew larger than the Turkish population.” Throughout the column, the Syrian presence in Turkey is presented as a threat and negative opinions about this identity are reinforced.
In the article reporting on the Russian foreign minister’s visit to the Genocide Memorial in Armenia, with the word play in the title, the person in question is **insulted due to his national identity.**

How could it have been written?

**title suggestion:** Russian Foreign Minister visits Genocide Memorial in Armenia

Journalistic language that insults all members of an identity and foments enmity against identities should have been avoided.

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6 In the Turkish title, a word play is made with the Turkish words “Rus” (Russian) and “orospu” (whore).
title: Suudi Kral için yas ilan ettigimiz Araplar bile bizi sırtımızdan hançerledi
[Even the Arabs, for whom we declared a period of mourning when the Saudi King died, stabbed us in the back]
newspaper: Sözcü
date: 13.10.2019
type: news article
author: Sözcü
targeted group(s): Arabs
category: enmity/war discourse

Reporting on the Arab League’s decision about Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, the article’s title accuses all Arabs of betrayal with the remark “The saying ‘Turks have no friend other than Turks’ is confirmed once again” above the title; thus enmity against Arabs is reinforced.
This article, covering the issue of Islamophobia, contains such statements as, “It is hard to miss the fact that European leaders’ repressive attitude has parallels with Western people’s aggressive attitude towards Muslims,” and “Disregarding the basic human right of freedom of religion, Western countries adopt a repressive attitude, while the remnants of the Crusaders attack our mosques in an organized way. While European capitals made decisions that ban Muslims from wearing the headscarf even on the street, Western people encouraged by leaders who incite Islamophobia organize bloody attacks on our mosques.” With such statements, all Westerners are implied as responsible for massacre and violence, presented as anti-Islam and anti-Muslim, and the perception of enmity against this identity is reinforced.
SİYASETÇİLERİNDEN GÜÇ VE CESARET ALAN NAZİ KAFASI, İSLÂM’A SALDIRIYOR

BATI YASAKÇI HALKI BASKIÇI

Dünyaya medeniyet ve insan hakları dersi vermekte kalkan Haçlı Avrupa toplayığı İslam’a ve Müslümanlara saldırıyor. Batılı siyasetçiler art arda İslam’ın emir ve kaidelerini yasaklarken, yönetici kadınlardan güç alan Nazi artıkları ise dini değerlerimize, başörtümüze ve camilerimize el uzatıyor...

İSTE BATI’NIN AYIP LİŞTESİ

■ Almanya’dan son bir ayda 29 camiye bombalı saldırı tehdidi yapıldı. 7 camiye filli saldırdı düzenledi.
■ 9 Temmuz’dan Hollanda’nın Tilburg kentinde Hollanda İslam Federasyonuna (NIF) bağlı Milli Görüş Tilburg Camii’ne saldırı gerçekleştildi.
■ Yeni Zelanda’nın Christchurch şehrinde iki camiye düzenlenen silahlı saldırıda 49 Müslüman şehit oldu.
■ Yukarı Avusturya eyaletteinin başkenti Linz’de bir cami kundaklandı, Krems kentinde bulunan Mescid-i Aksa Camii’ne ise bombalı saldırı yapıldı.
■ Fransa, Almanya, Avusturya, Hollanda, Bulgaristan ile Danimarka; peçe ve burka giyimini yasakladı.
■ İsviçre, Estonya, Litvanya ve Norveç gibi ülkeler, peçe ve burka yasaklarak içi harekete geçti.
■ Fransa, Avusturya ve Belçika da ise örtünme yasağı uzun sürelerdir yürütülmektedir.
title: Bir kişiyi bıçaklayan travestiler, kendilerini çeken gazetecilere tepki gösterdi
[Transvestites who stabbed a person reacted to journalists reporting]
newspaper: Karaman Gündem
date: 30.01.2019
type: news article
author: İHA
targeted group(s): LGBTIs

The reported criminal incident is covered with an emphasis on the suspect’s gender identity though it is not directly related to the incident, and this emphasis is maintained throughout the article. While the relation between the gender identity of suspects and the reported incident is not explained, transphobia and discrimination against LGBTIs is reinforced with the misuse of the word “transvestite.”

How could it have been written?

title suggestion: Knife attack in Karaman

In this article reporting a criminal incident, it would be enough to provide information as to where and why this incident happened, how it ended and the detention of the suspects. The term “transvestite” was incorrectly applied, and should not have been used. “Transvestite” is a term used to define specifically people who wish to look and act like a member of the opposite sex, but it does not contain any information regarding gender identity and sexual orientation. The usage of this word, which is commonly used to define transgender people in the media and is loaded with negative connotations in collective perception, reinforces transphobia. As long as it is not an indispensable part of news stories, the person in question should be asked how they want to be defined instead of using assumed definitions, and if this is not possible, the appropriate terminology should be found and used.7

BİR KİŞİYİ BİÇAKLAYAN TRAVESTİLER,
KENDİLERİNİ ÇEKEN GAZETECİLERE TEPKİ GÖSTERDİ

Karaman’da iki travesti, tartışıkları 1 kişiye kolundan biçaklayarak olay çıkarırken, kendilerini görüntüleyen gazetecilere de tepki gösterdi.

In the article, LGBTIs are coded as perverts and labeled as a threat to society due to their sexual orientation and gender identity as we see in the following sentence: “All illegal relationships, especially LGBTI perversion, are encouraged though YouTubers, famous actors and social media celebrities who are followed especially by the youth.” Thus, discrimination and violence that target LGBTIs are normalized and spread.
The article features author Furkan Altunöz’s opinions about some municipalities’ support for LGBT+ Pride Week; Yılmaz’s statements defining LGBTI individuals as “perverts” are used in the title without quotation marks. The article labels LGBTI individuals as a threat to society and targets them due to their sexual orientation and gender identity.
DISCRIMINATORY DISCOURSE REPORTS ISSUED AS PART OF THE MEDIA WATCH ON HATE SPEECH PROJECT

- Discriminatory discourse against Kurds in Turkey’s print media: The example of 2019 local elections
- “Saturday Mothers/People” in national press of Turkey: May 1995-September 2018
- Representation of Children in the Print Media of Turkey - June 2018
- Discrimination against Syrian Refugees in Media: Misinformation and Distortion (2017)
- Giaour Discourse in Print Media (2017)
- Four Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Discriminatory Discourse Analysis of the Media in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey (2016)
- Discriminatory Discourse in News Stories on Murders of Transgender Women (2016)
- Representation of Women in Media of Turkey: Newspaper and Internet Journalism (2015)
- Discriminatory Discourse against Syrian Refugees (2014)
- The Operation Israel Launched against Gaza and Discriminatory Language towards Jews in Media (2014)
- Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day One Year Left to the 100th Commemoration (2014)
- Discriminatory Discourse against Alevi People (2013)
- Discriminatory Discourse of the Print Media in the Coverage of Gezi Park Protests (2013)
- Black Sea Visit of HDK and BDP Representatives (2013)
DISCRIMINATORY DISCOURSE AGAINST KURDS IN TURKEY’S PRINT MEDIA

THE EXAMPLE OF 2019 LOCAL ELECTIONS

Serra Güvenuez
Emircan Saç
Gülbeyaz Sert
“Who is a part of the nation and who is not?”, “Are there gradations to being one of us, to belonging to a nation?” These questions have played an important part in shaping modern political communities, but have been given uniform, consistent answers in few places, if any. Experiences and literature on these experiences suggest that in many places in the world nationhood is built as a community whose limits may be narrowed or expanded and which has different gradations or designations for different members. In this regard, it is easy to see that Turkey is no exception to this. It may even be said that Turkey constitutes a good example of the amorphous and gradational quality of nationhood. The last one hundred years of Turkey has shown that what is referred to as “nation” or “Turkish nation” is a plurality with layers whose limits have been narrowing and expanding over time.

In a historical context, even though limits and gradations of nationhood in Turkey were established under the influence of innumerable factors and with the participation of ordinary people, the state was still the primary actor in the process, which is probably what happened elsewhere as well. Issues concerning who is one of “us” and who is not, who is at the center of the nation and who is on the margin, and who is in between, have been determined for one hundred years by what the state has been saying and doing.

When we look at what is said and done, what we see initially is the following: 1. The limits of what constitutes belonging to “the nation” and being one of “us” do not correspond precisely to those who are citizens of the Republic of Turkey or those who live within its boundaries; 2. There have always been gradations of belonging to “the nation” adorned with rules and exceptions. In other words, for the last hundred years, there have almost always been people whose belonging to the Turkish nation is considered suspicious, despite their being Turkish citizens, and there have been gradations of belonging to the nation.

This seemingly complex picture of limits and layers of “belonging to the Turkish nation” can be easily simplified. The state’s actions and discourse for a hundred years show that Christian and Jewish citizens of Turkey remained so marginal along the
limits of Turkish citizenship that they are almost outside of it, whereas Muslim cit-
izens who are considered a part of the nation are graded as “Turks” or “those who
are expected to become Turks.” Thus, the last hundred years of “belonging to the
Turkish nation” suggest that those who belong to the nation are designated as Turks
at the center, prospective Turks as in between and so-called Turks as on the margins.

Of course there have been exceptions to this system of gradation, which identifies
Turkish speaking Muslims as Turks, non-Turkish speaking Muslims, such as Kurds,
Circassians, Arabs and so on, as prospective Turks, and non-Muslims such as Arme-
nians, Greeks and Jews as so-called Turks. Circassians, who were accused of betray-
ing the state, Kurds who rebelled, and more recently Gulenists who attempted to
stage a coup, were quickly placed on the margins, if not outside of “belonging to
the nation.” Then again, Greek and Armenian citizens who “proved their loyalty to
the state” by helping, or fighting alongside, the Turkish army during the Turkish
War of Independence were temporarily taken in from the margins of the nation.

Despite these exceptions, the limits and gradations of “belonging to the Turkish
nation” were designated by the aforementioned logic of mobile gradation and its
consequences were manifested in accordance with this logic of gradation. After
one hundred years, a majority of Turkey’s Christians and Jews, who had been
kept on the margins and subjected to all kinds of discrimination and oppression,
moved outside of the sphere of the Turkish nation by leaving Turkey, the rest
remaining on the margins. On the other side, a majority of non-Turkish speaking
Muslims moved up to the designation of Turks from that of prospective Turks.

Except for Kurds, or most Kurds… While Bosniacs, the Laz, Circassians and Arabs
were to a large extent vacating the designation of prospective Turks and moving
to the central designation of “belonging to the Turkish nation”, a considerable
amount of the prospective Turk. Kurds did not accept the invitation to move to the
center of “belonging to the Turkish nation”, probably because they already consti-
tute a large population living in a specific region. In other words, the logic of mobile
gradation that conditioned the consequence of “belonging to the Turkish nation”
and which largely worked for Armenian, Greek, Syriac, Jewish, Bosniac, Circassian,
Laz, Arab citizens and so on, failed, or did not fully work, when it came to Kurds.

The fact that this logic in part failed and in part worked for the Kurds has funda-
mentally shaped the state’s attitudes towards them. From 1924 almost up to the
present day, the Turkish state has considered Kurds prospective Turks or so-called
Turks depending on the state of affairs, time and events, despite the fact that
Kurds, for a few years right before the foundation of the Republic, were seen as
equal citizens having the right to preserve their ethno-cultural identity. Kurds’ mobility in or against the Turkish nation rendered the state’s discourse and perception regarding Kurds as varied and mobile. This variety and mobility was reflected in the discourse and minds of institutions, politicians, media and citizens who look up to the state as the great designator of limits and gradations of belonging to the nation. While all these actors were thinking about, talking about, and creating their representations of Kurds, they did this with words, notions and images stretching along a spectrum from prospective Turks to so-called Turks.

Leaving aside those Kurds who became Turks “in every aspect” about whom no one feels a need to talk and think about at length or produce specific images, Kurds as prospective Turks have been labeled as “those who forgot about their ‘Turkishness’”; who stuck to the remnants of the past like religion and feudalism as tribes, lodges and cults; and who were subjected to underdeveloped economic conditions caused by geographical characteristics and feudal masters. Thus, there have been efforts to bring Kurds as prospective Turks into the sphere of Turks by reminding them of their Turkishness; having them make them contact with the Turkish language through instruments such as schools, military service and displacement; abolishing such remnants of the past as tribes, cults and feudalism; and helping them become developed and prosperous. During this work that is on the wane but still going on today, Kurds who were expected to become Turks have been mentioned with images and notions such as “mountain Turks”, “kart-kurt Turks”,8 “reactionaries”, “bigots”, “bandits”, “tailed Kurds”, “those who speak a 300-word language”, “those who speak a hybrid language of Persian-Turkish”, “kıro”9 “aghas and their croppers.” The common point of all these images and notions is obvious. Kurds were the ones who have to be fixed and adapted to the norm, the norm of Turkishness.

On the other hand, the uprisings of 1925 and 1930 and the insistence on the part of some Kurds to participate in politics around the idea of Kurdishness, showed that Kurds have some aspects that cannot be fit into the frame of prospective Turks. On the moments of encounter with this aspect of the Kurds, the state and those who are attached to the state through their discourse and minds decided that the Kurds’ relationship to Turkishness has also an aspect going beyond prospective Turkishness. Kurds as a people who are expected to promote Turkishness showed that they have a side that would make them one of those who have to be located

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8 This echoic word “kart kurt” refers to an absurd theory about Kurds’ origins. It is said that the name “Kurd” was derived from the sound “kart kurt”, which Turks’ boots made when they were walking on snow on mountains.

9 This word means “boy” in Kurdish, but it came to be used as an insulting word in Turkey.
outside, on the margin of Turkishness in the eyes of the state. This situation paved the way for replacing the notions and images that regard and show Kurds as prospective Turks with new ones. The aspects of Kurds that cross the limits of prospective Turkishness were mentioned with notions and images such as “red forces”, “those who must be burned alive with their homes and animals,” “those who are the tools of imperialism,” “those who wear a cap during the day and carry a gun at night,” “so-called citizens,” “those who make the wolves hungry.” The common point of this second set of notions and images is obvious as well: Kurds not as ones who have to be fixed and adapted to the norm of Turkishness, but ones who must be thrown out to the margins of Turkishness.

In short, a general overview shows that Kurds have been conceived of and talked about by the state and its supporters according to two sets of images over the last hundred years: Images that consider Kurds as prospective Turks and images that consider them as so-called Turks. Nevertheless, there was a general trend in the history of this depiction: For almost 50 years after the foundation of the Republic, Kurds had been largely mentioned with notions and images corresponding to the idea of prospective Turkishness; later they came to be mentioned with notions and images corresponding to the idea of so-called Turks, rarely at first and then increasingly in the ‘90s and ‘00s. Even though they came close to being considered equal citizens with the right to preserve their culture for a few years after 2010, this ended in 2015 and they continued to be mentioned with images suggesting that they are seen as prospective Turks sometimes and as so-called Turks most of the time.

In this situation that continues today, it is certainly not easy to identify which aspects of Kurds and how many Kurds are considered to be within the category of so-called Turkishness. Thus, it cannot be said that all Kurds with all their aspects are placed in the category of so-called Turkishness of “belonging to the Turkish nation.” However, given the fact that Kurds with Turkish citizenship constitute one fifth of the population, it can be said that a remarkable number of “aspects” of a considerable percentage of the citizenry are understood with images corresponding to so-called Turkishness.

Since the development of an environment that would make it possible again to code Kurds largely as prospective Turks is not very likely to happen, it seems that the adventure of becoming “us” or “nation” in Turkey is faced with this question: Will the current situation that places Kurds on the margins continue, or will there be a new situation that would render Kurds as equal citizens having the right to preserve their ethno-cultural identity? In other words, will the gradual quality of “being one of us” or “of the nation” continue in a way that more citizens than
ever are placed in the sphere of *so-called Turkishness*, or will we go on with a new way of “being one of us” or “of the nation” based on a different and equal citizenship freed from any gradations?

This report suggests that we are far away from the latter and shows that Kurds are still being coded based on the distinction between “acceptable” and “unacceptable.” While Kurds are not considered *so-called Turks* altogether, a considerable portion of them are thought of with images like “under the influence of foreign powers”, “deceived”, “anti-perpetuity” and “associated with terrorism.” The situation revealed by this report shows that we are still far away from “a way of being us” based on a different and equal citizenship freed from any gradations.
As part of the media monitoring work carried out under the Hrant Dink Foundation, hate speech in print media has been monitored, identified and exposed for 10 years. The considerable reservoir of knowledge and observation concerning hate speech in Turkey and reflection of discrimination in the media that has been created thanks to this uninterrupted work continues to grow. In the “Media Watch on Hate Speech” project, newspaper items considered as containing hate speech are listed based on factors such as targeted groups and types of discourse and examined through critical discourse analysis. The findings of this monitoring work focusing on media discourse reveal important aspects of discrimination, marginalization and polarization.

In identifying hate speech, the project takes as a basis the 1997 Recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. In this recommendation hate speech is defined as the following: “[Hate speech] covers all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”

Hate speech, as the expression of “discrimination in a more aggressive, insulting, plainly targeting and exclusionary” way, may directly and openly insult, marginalize, target, label and accuse the targeted group or identity.

Discriminatory discourse, which is more subtly constructed and targets or attacks more implicitly compared to hate speech though it is always discriminating and marginalizing, is found in the print media as frequently as hate speech. Although we

10 “Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on ‘hate speech’”, https://rm.coe.int/1680505d5b (last access: 9 April 2020).
define discriminatory discourse as a discourse that conveys its discriminatory message more subtly as compared to hate speech, it is hard to draw a clear line between the two. This challenge stems from the inherent difficulty of discussing discourse on one hand and the fact that discriminatory discourse is deeply intertwined in language in a latent way on the other hand.

Though print media’s discourse has continued to change in accordance with social and political developments over the years, it is observed that it frequently targets minorities and fragile groups with the hate speech it contains. It is even seen that some groups are always targeted by this discourse in the media. The fact that these groups are the fixed “other” of print media can be explained by deep-seated perceptions of enmity. On the other hand, the findings of media monitoring work sometimes fail to reveal all aspects of discrimination against other groups. Monitoring and analyzing this discrimination, which is sometimes expressed latently or implicitly, is critically important for revealing the forms and extent of discrimination in Turkey. Thus, as the Media Watch on Hate Speech Project, we open up for discussion discourses that are not technically considered hate speech and the media’s tendencies in this regard with “discriminatory discourse reports”; we try to analyze the discourse and discrimination based on specific cases such as women’s representation in media, the discourse in news stories on murders of transgender women, discrimination against Syrian refugees, representation of children, and media coverage of Saturday Mothers/People. Considering the last two years of media monitoring, we see that 39 out of 6,517 articles and columns that were identified as containing hate speech in 2017 targeted Kurds, and this number rose to 80 out of 6,782 in 2018. The fact that hate speech against Kurds was relatively less frequent in 2017 and 2018 makes it important to analyze print media’s discourse concerning Kurds and Kurdish identity and to reveal how direct or indirect discriminatory discourse is generated regarding Kurds.

In this report inspired by these considerations, the following issues are examined: Around which topics and themes the print media covers Kurds and how Kurdish identity and Kurds are presented in newspapers as a public platform. Considering the fact that the media’s discriminatory discourse becomes more obvious and clear during election periods when political debates intensify, this work focuses on discriminatory discourse against Kurds in print media. In this regard, a sample was set based on the remarkable developments that happened in 2019, especially during the period leading up to local elections. This sample was then monitored; articles and columns containing apparent discriminatory discourse were categorized and analyzed based on the ways in which they deal with topics related to Kurds or directly concerning Kurds.
Methodology

The language generated by the media is not just a neutral instrument used for sharing information and expressing opinions. The discourses coded into the language have social and cognitive influences and origins. The usage of language and discursive preferences are strategies; the way in which the print media presents news does not only include word choices and linguistic preferences, but also visual material. In this work, inspired by T. A. van Dijk’s discourse analysis which he elaborated in the context of micro-discursive meaning on sentence level, macro-discursive meaning on the topic level and socio-cognitive system that presents the distinction between “positive us”/“negative other”, a discourse analysis focusing on syntax, topics and metaphors was carried out. In the analysis of print media’s discursive strategies, critical discourse analysis theorist Ruth Wodak’s categorization is used to identify how targeted persons and/or groups are named (referential strategies); how these groups are defined and which characteristics are attributed to them (attribution strategies); which arguments are used for supporting discriminatory and marginalizing discourse containing negative generalization and reference and how these are arguments are justified (justification strategies); from which perspective and whose point of view is naming, defining and justification done (perspective strategies). In this work, elements like the tone of articles and columns, their themes and main actors of the texts, mentioned references, word choices and visual material preferences are used as a basis for examining the ways of speaking about Kurds and potential mental representation that would be created by all these elements. In other words, the aim was to answer the question how and in what ways Kurds are treated in articles and columns generating discriminatory discourse against Kurds.

Scope

Dealing with discriminatory discourse against the Kurds, this report consists in qualitative analysis of articles and columns published in 2019 in various newspapers. As with the aforementioned hate speech monitoring, a media monitoring work was carried out with the help of a media monitoring agency’s service based

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on keywords for this report. Considering the analyzed period, a list of words/phrases that may be related to this issue was created. The list includes the following: “Kurd” (and also “Kurds, “Kurdish fellows”, “Kurdish origin,” etc.), “East-erner/easterner”, “Southeasterner/southeasterner”, “Kurdistan”, “separatist”, “trustee”, “HDP” and “Öcalan.” Then texts from nine daily national newspapers (Birgün, Cumhuriyet, Evrensel, Hürriyet, Sabah, Sözcü, Star, Yeni Akit and Yeni Şafak) that contain those words were monitored and analyzed. The newspapers were chosen according to their ability to reach different groups in the political scene and their different ideological and political positions. In creating the sample, important developments during the process of local elections in 2019 were taken into consideration. Given that discriminatory discourse in media becomes more evident during an election period with heated issues and new debates, the focus was the six months from February 2019 when the election campaigns started until August 2019 when trustees were appointed to many municipalities.

In the study, each of the following topics were analyzed in terms of how they were covered in the selected newspapers in a period of one week: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement on the usage of the word “Kurdistan” during the local election process; local elections; Abdullah Öcalan’s first meeting with his lawyers after eight years; the Turkish Supreme Electoral Council’s decision to redo the election in Istanbul; former prime minister and candidate for Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor’s Office Binali Yıldırım’s visit to Diyarbakır; the redoing of the election in Istanbul; and appointment of trustees to several HDP municipalities. Though the monitored weeks were selected on the basis of important developments during the election process, all texts that include keywords were read and analyzed. Thus, as part of the monitoring work, articles and columns dealing with topics other than the election were also taken into consideration and a total of 2,356 newspaper items were analyzed. In the discourse analysis, the texts that were included in the sample after monitoring were analyzed under four categories based on the dominant type of discourse: “acceptable” Kurds / “unacceptable” Kurds; association of Kurdish language to crime; Kurds across the border; Kurdish identity as a “national security problem.”

The analysis of selected texts showed that the discourse varies depending on the topic and is constructed with various dynamics and systems. It is observed that some texts conveyed discriminatory and marginalizing messages concerning Kurds more implicitly than hate speech and with indirectly
constructed discourses, while some other texts made Kurdish identity a direct target of hate speech. In the articles and columns that were analyzed under the categories “acceptable” Kurds / “unacceptable” Kurds and Kurdish identity as a “national security problem”, there is a dominance of discourses that cannot be directly defined as hate speech but which are constructed more carefully to convey their discriminatory and marginalizing messages in more subtle ways. And the texts analyzed in the categories “association of Kurdish language to crime” and “Kurds across the border” are considered as examples of direct hate speech since they target Kurds as a whole and label the identity itself as the carrier of negativity by making generalizations about Kurdish identity.
PRINT MEDIA ANALYSIS

GENERAL FINDINGS

Since the focus of the report was the local elections in 2019, most of the analyzed articles and columns were about the election agenda. However, texts from the monitored newspapers about Kurds in Syria, Iran and Iraq were also analyzed.

In the discourses concerning Kurds in the monitored newspapers, it is seen that a language that directly or indirectly excludes and marginalizes Kurds and the practices of “inclusion” and “exclusion” are used. This is a concept mentioned by Ruth Wodak when she discusses discrimination generated through discourse. An “acceptable” Kurdish identity is defined and those who are outside of it are marginalized. While Kurdish identity is portrayed as positive and acceptable only on the basis of shared religious belief or choice of political party, Kurds who are considered unacceptable are associated with negativities by being identified as a group “under the influence of foreign powers”, “deceived”, “anti-perpetuity” and “associated with terrorism.” With these “attribution strategies” that are often used in the construction of such texts, “other Kurds” are presented as an element of threat. This report focuses on both extremes of print media’s discriminatory discourse against Kurds.

Not giving a place and voice to the subjects of the texts is an issue that was identified in our previous discriminatory discourse reports. This study also shows that in articles and columns about Kurds or which include analysis concerning Kurds, what this group has to say is not used as a primary source and their opinions are covered only

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in a very limited way, if at all. In these texts, the boundaries between providing information and giving commentary are breached and a commanding and judgmental language is used. This language that can be seen in many articles about Kurds is used to imply and regenerate the relationship of dominant constituent versus subaltern constituent. Thus, it can be said that Kurds are indirectly led to be passive and silent.

As stated in many other discriminatory discourse reports as well, the reported incidents or actions are associated with an identity in some texts. For instance, in news about car accidents, when the person who caused the accident was a woman, an emphasis like “woman driver had an accident” is often seen. Such articles generate sexism on the basis of prejudices that assume women are inexperienced and unskillful in driving\textsuperscript{16} and serve to foment such prejudice. Similarly, discrimination against Syrian refugees is also generated with an emphasis on national identity. For instance, in articles about various crimes, when the suspect is Syrian, this relationship is sometimes presented as if it is directly related to the incident. In articles analyzed for this study, it is seen that various incidents are reported with descriptions like “Kurdish terrorist” and “Kurdish insult.” The ethnic identity or language of those who are held responsible are highlighted in news articles. In this way, Kurdish identity is associated with violence and crime, and Kurds are portrayed as “the negative other” by being turned into the subjects of the negativities that are reported in articles. With such an emphasis on Kurdishness, Kurdish identity is depicted as a threat.

In newspaper items about Kurds living outside of Turkey, it is seen that discourses that target Kurds as a whole are dominant, and discriminatory language against Kurds takes on an aggressive, insulting and targeting tone when international or cross-border developments are discussed. In this regard, print media uses different discourses concerning Kurds within Turkey and Kurds across the border. For instance, while the claim that the “Kurdish state” will take Turkey’s lands incites hatred against the Kurds, the identity as a whole is turned into a target.\textsuperscript{17} On the other hand, in texts about Kurds living across the border, hate speech is easily used since there is a group that cannot be evaluated from within the boundaries of Turkey and Turkishness, and thus more malicious discourses are used.

\textsuperscript{16} Mahmut Çınar, Yonca Poyraz Doğan, Tayfun Ertan, Barış Soydan, and Rana Şenol, “Haberde Kadına Yönelik Cinsiyetçi Söylem”, in Ayrımcı Dile Karşı Habercilik Kılavuzu (İstanbul: P24, 2015), pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{17} Sabah, 5 April 2019.
“ACCEPTABLE” KURDS / “UNACCEPTABLE” KURDS

The way Kurds are positioned in relation to “Turkishness”, which is used as a cultural and legal code for defining the society of Turkey, may vary depending on the period and context. This positioning is shaped by “inclusion” and “exclusion” practices, which Wodak points out when discussing discrimination on the discursive level. Kurds are seen as “includable” into the “Turkishness sphere” in certain instances and sometimes they are held outside of this sphere through marginalization in terms of “us” and “them” opposition.18

This section deals with how the category “acceptable Kurd” is created during the regeneration of Kurdish identity and what kind of a discriminatory discourse this practice generates against Kurdish identity in the print media of Turkey. In the analyzed texts, Kurds who have “the positive aspects” of the dominant identity, who do not act on ideological motivations and who vote for the ruling party, are seen as acceptable, and embraced. The voices of Kurds who are not seen as acceptable are not included in such texts. The boundaries of acceptable identity are thus determined. The segments that are excluded and marginalized because they are not considered acceptable are coded as “anti-perpetuity”, “traitor” and “enemy” in some texts. Moreover, it is seen that the media generally presents Kurds not as active subjects who make their own decisions, but as passive subjects who cannot understand what is happening and who cannot see the truth.

This study reveals how local elections are used as an instrument for generating and popularizing discriminatory discourses. While the results of elections and Kurds’ voting preferences are turned into elements of discriminatory discourse against Kurds and their process of identity building, voting as a democratic competition becomes a process in which a group is marginalized and excluded.

In the article titled “Religious Kurds slapped HDP” focusing on the election results in Ağrı, Şırnak and Bitlis, it is implied that the “Kurdish question” was solved when “religious Kurds slapped HDP” with an image that makes reference to a “Solution Process” and by using the remark “the solution is found” above the title.19

19 Yeni Akit, 2 April 2019.

In an article which defines Kurds who voted for the ruling party as “Muslim Kurds”, Kurds who did not vote for the ruling party are demeaned by being implicitly labeled as “the ones who are not Muslim,” as we see in the following remark: “HDP, who did not present candidates in Western metropolitan cities in order to prevent the victory of the Public Coalition of AKP and MHP, and who focused on eastern and southeastern cities, is faced with the slap of Muslim Kurds in local election.” While Kurds who voted for the ruling party are affirmed with the description “Muslim Kurds”, Kurds who are not included in the frame drawn by the author, who do or do not highlight their Muslim identity, or who do not define themselves as Muslim, are not given voice.

The article also notes that “AKP which won favor in the eyes of Muslim Kurds” raised its votes by two points in eastern and southeastern regions compared to elections in 2014, and emphasizes that “Muslim Kurds” made this increase happen; but then this increase in votes is mentioned with the description “Turkish nation who retorted HDP in elections.” Mentioning the ones who voted for the ruling party under the label “Turkish nation” while positioning the ones who voted for HDP outside of this definition indirectly point to the building of “acceptable other” and “unacceptable other.” Throughout the article, Kurds are presented as a homogenous whole with the emphasis of belonging to the same religious and national community with the use of descriptions like “Muslim Kurds”, “religious Kurds” and “Turkish nation.”

It is observed that in some newspapers included in the sample the “perpetuity” discourse is frequently used while some newspapers avoid using this discourse. In newspaper items, “perpetuity” is coded as “loving Turkey”, “Turkey’s unity, persistence” and used to such an extent that it becomes an instrument for distinguishing a certain identity and generating discrimination; such much so that constituents of Kurdish identity are distinguished through the discourse of “perpetuity.”

Mehmet Acet, in his column titled “This is the result of the clash between Economy and ‘Perpetuity’”, deals with the result of the March 31st local elections.20 “Commenting on the voting behavior of Kurdish voters under the title “Strategic importance of Kurdish votes is understood once again,” the columnist creates an opposition by categorizing Kurdish identity according to the voted for party, as we see in the following sentence: “The distribution of Kurdish votes that HDP cannot turn into HDP supporters may be interpreted as a sign that the concern of perpetuity is reflected among Kurds more than Turks.” In the column, while political participation and voting behavior of Kurds who voted for the HDP is framed as “anti-perpetuity,” a language that distinguishes voters as “loving their country” or “not loving their country” on the basis of ethnic identity is used by turning elections as a

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20 Yeni Şafak, 3 April 2019.
democratic competition into an issue of “perpetuity.” Moreover, with the description “Kurdish votes that HDP cannot turn into HDP supporters,” the columnist portrays Kurds as passive subjects by implying that Kurds are somehow “misguided” and acting not of their own volition.
Reader letters that are selected for publication are significant since they reflect the editorial choices of newspapers. A letter published in Yeni Akit’s “Mail from Readers” with the title “Reconstruction must be based on consultation” is an example of this. Proposing a reconstruction “in state’s formal and civil institutions” and “political scene for the peace and prosperity of the country and nation,” the article portrays Kurdish citizens as subjects who cannot make decisions for themselves, as we see in the following statement: “In order to save our citizens and voters of Kurdish origin from the pressure of the terrorist organization PKK, we have to come together with the clan leaders and religious scholars of Kurdish origin and look for ways for explaining clearly about voting for political parties that submit to evil forces to our citizens with Kurdish origin.” Moreover, the columnist defines Kurds as “a group that is in need of being saved from the pressure of a terrorist organization” by assuming a protective and patronizing role, which further reinforces the attribution of passivity. On the other hand, Kurds are marked as a dangerous group with the claim that they vote for political parties “submitting to evil forces.”
Also, with the remarks “come together with the clan leaders and religious scholars of Kurdish origin” and “With all its might, the state must show that it always supports patriotic and religious Kurdish clans and religious scholars,” Kurdish identity is recognized on the basis of clans and implicitly defined in terms of being Muslim. Sides of the “Kurdish question” are divided into acceptable and unacceptable ones with portrayal of the legitimate side of the issue as including “patriotic and religious Kurdish clans” and “religious scholars.” Thus, the columnist considers only the ones whom he deems acceptable as a part of the reconstruction for “peace and prosperity of the country and nation.” To summarize, Kurdish identity is polarized on the basis of being “acceptable” or “unacceptable.”

Resul Tosun, in his column titled “The man who made Kurds love the state!”, comments on the periods before and after 2002 when the AKP came to power and makes some comparisons between the two periods. With the remark, “Methods for countering terrorism before 2002 turned Kurds against the state,” the governments of the periods in question are criticized with the suggestion that they did not carry out counter-terrorism methods legally. Stating that AKP governments “carried out counter-terrorism legally” and acted as a “paternal state with relief actions,” the columnist tries to draw a line between before and after 2002, but he still discusses Kurds from the perspective of “counter terrorism” for both periods.

Furthermore, the columnist constructs two opposite poles of Kurdish identity and implies that Kurds are a community either “acting with faith in religious unity” or “led to side with the PKK” as we see in the following sentence: “At the beginning of the 1900s, when the British wanted Kurds to found a state [and when] the foundation of a Kurdish state was opened up for discussion (...) during the Lausanne meetings, Kurds were acting with faith in religious unity, [but later] because of wrong policies of counter terrorism, they were led to side with the PKK.” While being acceptable is associated with “religious unity” and being unacceptable with “led to side with the PKK”, one group is attributed positive qualities and the other group is associated with terrorism.

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Kürtlere devleti sevdiren adam!

2002’den önceki yıllarda terörle mücadele ederken kullanılan yöntemler Kürtleri devletten şok etmiştir. O politikalar Kürtleri işyan bayrağı açan PKK’nın siyası vaatleri nın yanına itmiş ister istemez.

İşin etnik boyutu bir yana kimi dindar Kürtler bile karşılaştıkları muamele sebebiyle bir gerekçe bulup, inanca değerleriyle taban tabana zıt PKK vaatleri partilere destek verdim!

1900’lü yılların başında Ingilizler Kürtlere bir devlet kurduklarında меропilmişler, diyeti reddedenden Kürtler, Lozan görüşmelerinde de Kürt devleti kurulmasi gündemde gelmiştir. Nüfusunun büyüklüğüyle birlikte Türkiye’den ayrılmak istemediklerine dair Lozan’a telgraf çekmişlerdi.

Bağımız devlet kurma imkanı sunulmuşken ümmet bilinciyle hareket edip o teldif fi rededen Kürtler, Lozan görüşmelerinde de Kürt devleti kurulmasi gündemde gelmiştir. Nüfusunun büyüklüğüyle birlikte Türkiye’den ayrılmak istemediklerine dair Lozan’a telgraf çekmişlerdi.

2002’den sonra gelen hükmüetler terörle mücadeledeki ürûrp birlikte, bu hükmüetler için sorumlu adımlar atıldığı ve bozan tarafın terör örgütü olduğu üzerinden anladıklarında devleti yeniden sevmeye başladılar!

Hele de atanan kayyumların getirdiği emsalimiz hizmetleri görüşe aradaki farkı daha iyi anladılır.

Ama terör örgütünün söylediği korku halkın sindirmiş korken de olsa PKK vaatleri siyasi partide destek vermişlerdir.

Son üç seneden beri yürüttülen terörle mücadele sonucu örgütün halk üzerindeki baskısı bitmiş artık terör örgütü mensuplarından korkar ve kaçar hale gelmişler, halk özgürce oy kullanma imkanına kavuşmuş o yıldız cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminde Bölge hiçfeldir bir artış gerçekleşmiştir.


Aynı sorulan bölgeyi çok iyi bili Diyarbakr’te tecrübeli ve saçılmış birine sordum. O da Batmanlı dostumunun dediğini ve Doğuda PKK vaatleri partinin de kimi kılavuzları olanla var ama Erdoğan ve AK Parti’nin oylarını artırmak dedi.

Daha AK Parti kurulmadan Doğu’ya yaptırım ziyaretlerde dağların altında ki köylere odalardan bile Erdoğan fotoğraflarını görmüş o seyrelse bizah sahih olmuştur.


Asker ve polis hainlerden temizlendikten sonra, Işıkları Bakırköy Soylu’nun azimli kararlı ve dirayeti yönetiminde devletiniz artık alan hakimiyetini ele geçirmiş ve terör örgütü korkanı ve kaçan tarafın olmuştur.

Simdi görülün Erdoğan’ın yana olanlar özgürlüğe oy kullanıp AK Partiye oy verme imkanına kavuşmanın sevincini yaşamaktarı!

Bir zamanlar AK Parti’de siyaset yapap bu seçime AK Parti’ye oy vermeeyeceğini ilan edenlerle ihat olunur!
ASSOCIATION OF KURDISH LANGUAGE TO CRIME

In articles and columns generating discriminatory discourse against Kurds, it is seen that the Kurdish language is also targeted. This targeting has a more implicit quality compared to hate speech; discrimination against the Kurdish language is done not by mentioning it directly with a malicious discourse, but rather by mentioning it in association with crime or appealing to existing prejudices. Association with crime emerges when the Kurdish language as a natural part of the identity is used for defining the crime and criminal in stories on crimes. In some cases, just mentioning the Kurdish language in articles is enough to associate it with criminality. In this section, how the Kurdish language is associated with criminal incidents in the selected newspapers and what kind of a discriminatory discourse this practice generates will be analyzed.

The article titled “One dangerous provocation after the other in the capital” reports on graffiti appearing under a bridge in Ankara. With the statements “Provocative writings in the streets and bridges in Ankara” and “‘Biji Mansur’, meaning ‘Long live Mansur’ in Kurdish is written under the bridges, giving the impression that Nation Coalition candidate Mansur Yavaş is cooperating with HDP”, Kurdish language is approached in the context of a “dangerous provocation.” The article’s noting that the incident was brought to prosecution gives the reader the impression that Kurdish language may be a crime factor.

The article titled “YPG/PKK terrorists executed the Arab couple” reports a criminal incident that allegedly happened in Syria. The article does not give clear information about where this incident took place (first the city Hasakah, then Raqqa, is mentioned), but the language that the suspects speak is emphasized with the description “YPG/PKK terrorists who swear in Kurdish.” In the article, the language that the suspects speak is highlighted, though it is not directly related to the incident.

23 Sözcü, 6 March 2019.
24 Sabah, 3 May 2019.
Under the title “Reaction against YPG/PKK occupation continues”, a demonstra-
tion that is said to have been staged by Arabs against YPG in Syrian city Deir ez-Zor
is reported. Although the murder story featured on the left of the image and the
demonstration story featured under the image are about two different incidents,
this juxtaposition gives the reader the impression that the two incidents are related.

In the first part of the article, with the statement “The footage showing that YPG/
PKK terrorists who swear in Kurdish took out their anger on the Arab couple whom
they stopped at the scene has been shared on social media”, what is happening in
Syria is portrayed as a Kurdish-Arabic conflict with an emphasis on the ethnic iden-
tity of the murdered and then a demonstration that is said to be staged by Arabs. In
the article, the murder is implicitly associated with Kurdish identity by emphasizing
that insults were made in Kurdish. The article associates Kurdish identity with crime
in both ways in which it covers the story.

The newspaper Yeni Akit covering the same incident with the title “PKK mem-
bers executed Arab couple on the street” also features the statement “The
footage showing that YPG/PKK terrorists who swear in Kurdish took out their anger on the Arab couple whom they stopped at the scene has been shared on social media.” With this sentence, Kurdish language is associated with crime as in the article by the newspaper Sabah.

KURDS ACROSS THE BORDER

In this section, articles and columns generating discriminatory discourse against Kurds living outside Turkey will be analyzed. It is seen that the media constructs quite a different discourse in covering Kurds living outside of Turkey compared to the texts about Kurds living in Turkey; there is harsh exclusion and hate speech beyond discrimination and marginalization.

Yeni Şafak, 5 July 2019
The article titled “Turkish villages in Iran raided” reports on the events in the West Azerbaijan province of Iran. In the article stating that Iran-based PEJAK started to “raid Turkish villages”, it is also claimed that the provincial governor “put thousands of Kurdish terrorists on salary” and Kurdish identity is associated with terrorism. Prejudice against Kurds is fomented with an emphasis on the identity itself as the perpetrator of the events in question.

Moreover, with the statement quoted from the locals “West Azerbaijan Governor Mohammad Mehdi Shahriari of Kurdish origin is behind the blocking of all energy, water, education and other infrastructure services. The governor who was involved in many scandals to the detriment of Turks is protected by Interior minister Rahmani Fazli, who is also of Kurdish origin”, the fact that the governor and interior minister are Kurdish is emphasized. A polarizing language based on the categories “us” and “them” is used in the article and the impression of enmity between Turks and Kurds is given.

An article published in Sözcü with the title “They are using Kurds to divide Syria” reports on the statements of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the US presence in Syria. Lavrov’s remark “We are faced with the fact that the US is speculating. The US is trying to use Kurds to establish a so-called state on the west of the Euphrates including the regions where Kurds weren’t previously living” is changed and featured in the title. With the title “They are using Kurds to divide Syria”, Kurdish identity is associated with the division of Syria on one hand and on the other hand Kurds are represented as passive subjects who are used by other forces. Moreover, throughout the article Kurds are encoded as an element of danger and threat.

Sözcü, 4 July 2019
The article published in Yeni Şafak with the title “Kirkuk on the verge of clash” reports the incidents that happened during Newroz celebrations in Kirkuk.\textsuperscript{28} In the article, it is emphasized that “Kurdish parties” insisted on celebrating without permission although celebrations in Kirkuk Citadel require a permit from the governor’s office. With the expressions “Kurdish parties (…) without a permit” and “Kurdish parties who want to assume dominance in Kirkuk again did not obey this ban”, Kurdish identity is presented as the carrier of the mentioned negativities. The text does not include the names of the political parties in question; the group turned into the subject of the news is rendered vague and only Kurdish identity is mentioned. Moreover, with the claim that these political parties made a call without a permit and that there were “armed groups” in the celebration, Kurdish identity is associated with being dangerous, escalating conflict and causing tension.

The negative image created in the article is supported with a photograph of people carrying the flag of Iraqi Kurdistan, with the caption “Kirkuk on the verge of clash” and an image of a helicopter flying low.

\textsuperscript{28} Yeni Şafak, 21 March 2019.
KURDISH IDENTITY AS A “NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM”

In the analyzed texts published during the given period, it is seen that Kurdish identity is often framed with danger and security concerns and thus Kurds are mentioned with labels such as “danger”, “against Turkey”, “enemy”, “guided by others” in association with security concerns as part of hate speech and discriminatory discourse. In this section, how Kurds are associated with national security concerns in news articles and columns and what kind of a discriminatory discourse is generated in this way will be analyzed.
Rahim Er, in his column titled “The backdrop of ’dictator’ discourse” states “the establishment of a sub-contract Kurdish garrison state from Erbil to the Mediterranean is prevented by Operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch,” and he reinforces negative sentiments about Kurds with the description “sub-contract Kurdish garrison state.” The columnist, by implying that Kurds are enemy troops owned by foreign forces, with metaphors of “sub-contract” and “garrison”, indirectly represents—in an indirect way—Kurdish identity as a threat facing Turkey.

Engin Ardıç’s column titled “Seriously dangerous times ahead” deals with Turkey’s NATO membership and Turkey’s relationship with NATO. Targeting the opposition leader by creating fear through Kurds, Ardıç represents Kurds as a negative part of the “dangerous times ahead” vision, as we see in the following sentence: “If Kılıçdaroğlu becomes president of this country one day (…) he wouldn’t mind when a Kurdish state is established under his nose.” Moreover, with the remark “This is what a Kurdish state that would demand Turkey’s lands and the US want”, he associates Kurdish identity with separatism based on a conspiracy theory.
This report analyzes around which topics and themes the print media covers Kurds and how Kurdish identity and Kurds are presented in newspapers as a public platform; considering the observation that media’s discriminatory discourse becomes more obvious and clear during an election period when political debates intensify, the focus was the period leading up to local elections in 2019. The texts in the sample were analyzed under the categories based on the ways in which they deal with topics directly or indirectly related to Kurds. In the articles and columns about Kurds published in the monitored newspapers, it is seen that a discriminatory discourse that directly or indirectly excludes and marginalizes Kurds, and marginalizes those who are outside of “acceptable” Kurdish identity, is generated. While Kurdish identity is portrayed as positive and acceptable only on the basis of shared religious belief or choice of political party, Kurds who are not considered acceptable are associated with negativities by being portrayed as a group “under the influence of foreign powers”, “deceived”, “anti-perpetuity” and “associated with terrorism.” Thus, in this report, both exclusionary and inclusionary aspects of the discourse on Kurds generated by print media were analyzed.

It can be said that in articles and columns that are about Kurds or that include analysis concerning Kurds, what this group itself has to say is not used as a primary source and their opinions are covered only in a very limited way; the boundaries of providing information and making comments are breached and a commanding and judgmental language is used. Thus, it can be said that Kurds are rendered passive and silent in these texts.

In the analyzed articles, it is observed that sometimes the ethnic identity or language of the suspected people is emphasized, and descriptions like “Kurdish terrorist” and “Kurdish insult” are used. Through this language adopted by print media, Kurdish identity is associated with crime and Kurds are portrayed as the actor of negativities, thus “the negative other” in news.

In the analyzed texts, it is seen that hate speech is generated more explicitly about Kurds who live across the border compared to Kurds within Turkey. In texts about Kurds across the border, hate speech is more easily employed against this group who

CONCLUSION
cannot be considered within the boundaries of Turkey and Turkishness, and more malicious discourses are generated. However, print media’s discourse on Kurds living outside of Turkey is sometimes extended to include all constituents of Kurdish identity and makes Kurds as a community the target of discrimination. In this report, the language that print media uses in dealing with the Kurds and issues related to them was examined in terms of ways of generating hate speech and its examples, then they were analyzed under specified categories. We hope this report helps to initiate discussion on discriminatory discourse against Kurds and rooted discriminatory tendencies of print media, and also to contribute to the recognition and understanding of the various dimensions of discrimination on a social level and ultimately to efforts for creating an alternative discourse for combating discrimination.
Media Watch on Hate Speech is a media monitoring project that has been carried out under the Hrant Dink Foundation for 10 years now. Through the uninterrupted media monitoring work conducted over this decade, significant data, in terms of quality as well as quantity, has been accumulated, and analyzed by experts. While conducting the research on hate speech and discriminatory discourse, the foundation also continues to initiate and carry out discussions around these concepts in order to keep this issue relevant to the public.

As part of the media monitoring project, weekday issues of all national newspapers and almost 500 local newspapers are monitored. It was observed that in 2019 hate speech was produced on an average of more than 17 articles and columns per day; 80 different ethnic, religious and national identities were targeted throughout the year in these texts; thus negative sentiments about these identities were reinforced. The data obtained through this work suggest that current issues also contribute to the rise of hate speech against certain identities, in addition to more rooted and deep-seated hatred. For instance, it is seen that the racist attacks on two mosques in New Zealand on March 15, 2019 were covered with discourses that associate Christians, non-Muslims and New Zealanders with terrorism. Groups such as Armenians, Jews, Greeks and Syrians are targeted systematically and frequently, regardless of the hot topics of the day.

Changes in the quality of hate speech is equally as important as the quantitative data about hate speech. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, 12% and 16%, respectively, of the hate speech examples found contained enmity and war discourse, a rate that rose to above 18% in 2019. This fact shows that hate speech is targeting various groups and portraying them as enemies in an increasingly more open manner.

In light of these findings, it may be said that print media in Turkey systematically generates discriminatory discourse and hate speech. This situation is caused by the social and political atmosphere in Turkey, as well as the media ecosystem in which

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such discourse is generated. This context is not peculiar to the media and society of Turkey, and hate speech and discriminatory discourse is not a problem exclusive to Turkey. Political tendencies such as rising nationalist and populist discourses around the world, polarization, xenophobia, anti-refugee and anti-migrant sentiments nurture and popularize discrimination. This situation points to the need to counter hate speech and discriminatory discourse not only locally but also globally, and to the importance of raising awareness.

It can be seen that the Covid-19 pandemic, which started in the winter of 2019 and reached a global scale before long, increased xenophobia, racism and anti-migrant sentiments. Migrants and refugees who are seen as the cause of various unfavorable political developments, and as a threat against the social structure, are stigmatized as “the usual suspects” in association with the pandemic. The discourse of public figures and politicians has a guiding role in this regard. Thus, there is a need for a new discourse and mindset that would reveal the structural and socioeconomic problems that migrants and refugees face, and the fragility of these groups; a discourse that would contribute to removing the labels which are put on these people.32

When initial information about the virus and its disease was gathered, a curfew was imposed in Turkey on children, elders and people with chronic diseases on the grounds that they are high risk groups, a practice that has a stigmatizing effect. In parallel with this effect, other types of discrimination such as ageism and ableism were opened up for discussion. In addition, various precautions for preventing the spread of the disease such as “working from home”, “home education” and “online shopping” made visible the inequalities that exist in terms of accessing and benefiting from these precautionary measures. Furthermore, the inequalities in access to healthy living practices are especially aggravated for many people working in sectors like food, transportation, and manufacturing, the production and service operations of which continued uninterrupted during the pandemic. These inequalities are covered and discussed through discriminatory discourses against these groups.

While this report was being written, anti-racist protests that started in the US were already being embraced by many countries such as the UK, France, Brazil and Indonesia, and protests and debates revolving around anti-racism, racial inequality and anti-discrimination were being given extensive coverage. The global outburst against racism and police violence that occurred after George Floyd, a Black US citizen, was killed by police has the potential to guide many global anti-discrimination

efforts and discussions. The media should be included in these efforts, given its role in spreading racism and discrimination. For instance, the frequent use of the description “unarmed black man” in the coverage of Floyd’s murder, especially in the US media, gave way to a new discussion about the language used in the news. With emphasis on the fact that the victim was unarmed, prejudices that associate Black people with crime are regenerated and the legitimacy of killing is reduced to a framework of causality solely based on whether or not the victim was armed. In other words, the fact that Floyd was Black is implicitly presented as a factor that would legitimize his murder. In discussions about this issue, the language that media outlets generate is questioned in terms of the way it legitimizes violence.

While hate speech and racism spread on different platforms and take on new shapes, methods for countering them also diversify and spread. Corporate policies of platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube for countering fake news, hate speech and aggressive discourse are being closely followed and discussed globally. The need for creating a pluralist, inclusive and rights-based discourse in every field and sector feels increasingly urgent. Thus, two predictions can be made in this regard: the risks of leaving identification of the line between hate speech and freedom of expression to private companies will be increasingly questioned, and the responsibility of states, public institutions, traditional means of communication, civil society actors and international organizations in these efforts will be discussed more.

As of 2020, Media Watch on Hate Speech project takes a break from systematic media monitoring work and issuing periodical hate speech reports in order to continue its efforts with different methods concerning hate speech and other ways of countering it. It is certainly important to analyze and discuss the examples of discrimination and intolerance such as hate speech, discriminatory discourse, gender-based discrimination, homophobia, and transphobia in order to counter them. Thus, inspired by the belief that a language and life free from racism, hate speech and discrimination is possible in print media, all other media and every aspect of life, we will continue to carry out various works for raising awareness in online platforms. Moreover, in 2020, we are preparing to open the archive of our 10-year media monitoring work to researchers.

We hope this report, like our previous reports, contributes to the creation of a rights-based, pluralist discourse that is free from discrimination, racism and violence.
